

PLAIN TALK

OCTOBER, 1947

25 CENTS

DOLLARS vs. COMMUNISM
HENRY HAZLITT
on
page 17

The Real Trygve Lie

STALIN'S TOOL IN THE U.N.?

By SHEPPARD MARLEY *page 3*

Our Student Comes of Age.....	Andrew Lund	10
Molotov's Newest Bluff.....	Alexander Szász	13
Is Profit Sharing A Solution?.....	I.D.L.	14
He Welcomed Wallace.....	Kurt Singer	15
Million-Dollar Baby	Alfred Kohlberg	23
Acid Test for AVC.....	Ralph de Toledano	24
Letter to A Communist.....	Lyle Yost	39
A Note of Mystery.....	Eugene Lyons	40
A Bookman's Horizon	Burton Rascoe	41
Summer Clergy	Frederick W. Beekman	45
John Stuart Mill.....	Edna Lonigan	47
On Liberty (A Condensation)...	John Stuart Mill	49
Libertygram	A New Game	63

Sec. Byrnes' Top Security Man Tells the Inside Story of COMRADE MARZANI IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT

By J. ANTHONY PANUCH *page 27*

FORMER DEPUTY ASST. SECRETARY OF STATE

A World of Freemen—America's Best Defense

PLAIN
TALK

VOL. II, NO. 1

ISAAC DON LEVINE Editor
MABEL TRAVIS WOOD . . Managing Editor
Contributing Editors
EUGENE LYONS SUZANNE LA FOLLETTE
GEORGE S. SCHUYLER

OCTOBER, 1947

A Word to You

BURTON RASCOE, who inaugurates A Bookman's Horizon, our new department, is one of the country's veteran literary critics . . . has served as editor and reviewer on a dozen leading newspapers and national magazines, including *The Bookman*, since 1919 . . . more recently served as drama critic of the *New York World Telegram* . . . memorable among the score of books and anthologies to his credit are *Titans of Literature* and the autobiographical *Before I Forget*.

THE AUTHOR of *Comrade Marzani in the State Department*, J. ANTHONY PANUCH, organized the intelligence and security services of the State Department under Secretary Byrnes . . . a graduate of Fordham College and Columbia Law School . . . practiced international law until 1938 . . . served as chairman of the Policy Committee of the Board of Economic Warfare and on the staff of General Somervell during the war . . . resigned from the State Department with the retirement of Secretary Byrnes last January.

HENRY HAZLITT, writer on economics and literary critic, recently became associated with *Newsweek* where his column, *Business Tides*, has attracted nation-wide attention . . . to his *Dollars vs. Communism—Flaws in the Marshall Plan* he brings the experience of many years' service as an editorial writer on *The New York Times* . . . his *Economics in One Lesson* (Harper & Bros.), a trenchant analysis of the economic fallacies of the day, is still a lively seller.

THE SENIOR resident American clergyman in Europe, Dean of the American Cathedral (Protestant-Episcopal) in Paris, THE VERY REV. FREDERICK W. BEEKMAN writes on the *Summer Clergy in Sovietdom* from a most intimate knowledge of the problem . . . one of the founders and protagonists of the pro-Ally Fight for Freedom before Pearl Harbor . . . selected to deliver a sermon on war issues at the general convention of the Episcopal Church at Kansas City in October, 1940 . . . a War Department lecturer to army camps during 1942-43 * * * SHEPPARD MARLEY, author of *The Real Trygve Lie*, a young student of international affairs, will be remembered for his outstanding contributions to PLAIN TALK on *Mrs. Dean's Foreign Policy* (November) and *The Institute of Pacific Relations* (December-January) * * * ALEXANDER SZÁSZ (*Molotov's Newest Bluff*), Hungarian economist and diplomat . . . came to this country in 1946 as Financial Counselor of the Hungarian Legation in Washington . . . resigned when Premier Nagy was ousted, refusing to recognize the new Communist-dominated Hungarian regime * * * One more word . . . don't miss the *Libertygram* on page 63.

THE EDITORS

Published monthly by Plain Talk, Inc. Editorial offices at 240 Madison Avenue, New York 16, N. Y. 25 cents a copy, \$3.00 a year in the United States and possessions, \$4.00 elsewhere. Entered as second-class matter January 2, 1947, at the post office at New York, under the act of March 3, 1879. Reproduction or use beyond 500 words without express permission of the editor is prohibited. Copyright, 1947, by Plain Talk, Inc.

STALIN'S TOOL IN THE U.N.?

By SHEPPARD MARLEY

THE SOVIET UNION used the veto power for the twenty-first—and not the twentieth time as is generally believed—on September 15th last, the day before the U. N. General Assembly opened its current session.

Russia's first veto was exercised informally on January 29, 1946, to insure the election of Trygve Lie as Secretary-General of the U. N. Andrei Gromyko wielded the veto club off the record when the eleven-nations Security Council met at Church House in London.

It all began when Stalin's representatives proposed the election by acclaim of Trygve Lie as President of the General Assembly, even though the rules called for a secret ballot. When Lie was defeated by the Belgian Paul-Henri Spaak, Mr. Gromyko resorted for the first time to his now-familiar weapon. The occasion presented itself when the Soviet delegation was informed that Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Ambassador to Washington, had the support of eight out of the eleven members of the Security Council for the post of Secretary-General. Although this selection was strictly a procedural matter, and as such exempted from the veto, the Western architects of the United Nations beat a hasty retreat in the face of Gromyko's threat to veto Mr. Pearson.

"The Russians got the candidate they wanted 'without even mentioning his name at the meeting,'" reported James Reston of *The New York Times*, in his description of the behind-the-scenes maneuvers: "The first veto in the UNO was cast without ever really being cast." To date, none of the leading actors in this silent rape of the United Nations

Charter has confided the full story to the general public.

When the Russians went to this extreme so early in the career of the U. N. they were not acting blindly. Trygve Lie had proved himself a reliable friend of the Stalin regime for nearly a quarter of a century, and fully merited this display of confidence, for which he, in turn, has shown genuine gratitude by definite services to the U.S.S.R.

Trygve Lie first visited the Soviet Union in 1921 as a rising young official in the Norwegian Labor Party. This group was one of the first to affiliate with Lenin's new Third International in 1919, but it broke with the Kremlin in 1923. Lie, however, managed to remain in the good graces of those who ruled Russia and international communism.

Lie's most recent visit to Moscow in July, 1946, was made under vastly different circumstances. He was now Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Stalin was supreme in Russia. On this visit he spent four days conferring with Stalin, Molotov and Vishinsky. Upon his arrival in Copenhagen in a Russian plane, he is reported to have announced that the Soviet leaders had expressed "the greatest optimism" about the U. N., and had shown real interest in international cooperation (after all, there were only five Russian vetoes at that time). Lie was impressed, too, by Stalin's wide knowledge of international affairs.

In the 1920s Lie maintained his connections with the rulers of Russia through his position in the Norwegian Labor Party and his membership in an ultra-radical wing within the Interna-

tional Federation of Trade Unions at Amsterdam. The leader of this wing, Edo Fimmen of Holland, for years flirted with the Soviet trade unions.

DURING THE 1930s, after the announcement of the world-wide united front, Norwegian Communists were able to penetrate more deeply into the Labor Party. It was in this period that Trygve Lie performed his greatest service for Stalin: he was instrumental in deporting Stalin's arch-enemy, Leon Trotsky, from Norway in 1936. The question has been posed whether Lie at that time had direct contact with the Russian secret police.

Trotsky entered Norway in June, 1935. He was undisturbed until the fall of 1936, after the famous Moscow trials of Zinoviev and other high Communists had implicated him in a plot to overthrow the Soviet Government.

At this time Trygve Lie was Norway's Minister of Justice. On August 13, the day before it was announced that the trials of the Russian revolutionary leaders would be held, Lie sent the chief of police in charge of criminal cases to Trotsky's residence to conduct an investigation. Soon Norwegian newspapers began a campaign against Trotsky, accusing him of plotting with the Nazis and of various crimes against the friendly Russian government.

Trotsky, one of the founders of the Communist International, reported in 1937 that Lie, "the Minister of Justice, who not so long ago had been a member of the Communist International, did not have the least sympathy for the liberalism of the chief of criminal police."

Later Trotsky received two more visitors from Lie—the chief of the Norwegian police and the head of the passport bureau. He was told to stop writing on current events and to submit his mail

for censorship. Since there was no legal way to enforce such restrictions even against a foreigner, Lie next tried to get Trotsky to sign a statement voluntarily offering to submit to censorship. In rejecting this ingenious proposal, Trotsky pointed out that Minister of Justice Lie was aiding the prosecutor of the Moscow trials by trying to prevent one of the accused from replying to the serious charges.

Not long after this incident, Trotsky's room was broken into. The police took him to Oslo, supposedly in order that he might testify against the interlopers. He was brought before Lie, who demanded that Trotsky voluntarily accept police control of his mail and visitors.

"If you want to arrest me, why do you need my consent?" Trotsky has written that he asked Lie.

"There is an intermediate status between arrest and full freedom," the Minister answered.

Trotsky replied: "That may be a trap. I prefer an outright arrest."

Lie complied. Three days later he legalized his illegal act by arranging a retroactive decree giving the Minister of Justice the power to intern undesirable aliens. Then he expelled from Norway Trotsky's two secretaries, one a citizen of France and the other of Czechoslovakia.

Trotsky has reported that Lie visited him several times in his internment to check on security measures, but refused him permission to get in touch with his friends to arrange his departure from the country. During the last of these visits Trotsky told Lie that even in Czarist Russia prisoners were granted the right to arrange their personal affairs through friends.

"Yes, yes," Lie is said to have replied, "but times have changed."

While Trotsky was detained, it was

learned that Lie had suppressed a letter written him by Trotsky on August 26. Copies of the letter were forcibly taken from Trotsky's secretaries, but one had already been sent out of the country and was finally published in *The Nation* of October 10, 1936. In the letter Trotsky appealed for an open trial:

"To refrain from bringing me to trial before a Norwegian court and at the same time to rob me of the possibility of appeal to public opinion on a question that concerns myself, my son, my whole political past, and my political honor, would mean to transform the right of asylum into a trap and to allow free passage to the executioners and slanderers of the GPU."

The Norwegian Minister of Justice did not heed this plea. Instead he arranged the details of Trotsky's secret journey to Mexico, where the Russian revolutionist was murdered by an assassin of Stalin's GPU.

A DECADE after the Trotsky affair both Trygve Lie and the U.S.S.R. had advanced in their respective spheres. By April of 1945, Lie was Norway's Foreign Minister, and the Soviet Union was in eastern Europe. In *The New York Times* of January 11, 1947, correspondent C. L. Sulzberger stated:

"According to responsible diplomatic sources, the Norwegian Government proposed to the Soviet Union on April 9, 1945, the joint defense of Spitzbergen . . . The offer is said to have been made while Trygve Lie was Foreign Minister of Norway."

This move under Lie's stewardship a month before the end of the war in Europe is significant for a number of reasons, since it involved the fortification of the Svalbard Archipelago, including Bear Island, north of Norway. It would have given Russia an Arctic

base closer than its own Arctic possessions to Canada and the United States. It would also have meant, probably, the inclusion of Norway in the Soviet sphere, resulting in even greater pressure on Sweden, which would have been placed precariously between two areas influenced by the U.S.S.R.—since Finland is on its east.

Aside from the danger of this plan, it would have been a violation of the Svalbard Treaty of 1920 unless agreed to by the United States, Britain and France, which were joint signatories to the pact giving Norway control of the archipelago. When asked for a statement on the Sulzberger report, Lie declined to comment on any aspect of the Spitzbergen incident.

Because of little services like these, the Kremlin knew Trygve Lie to be a real friend. The Soviet Union's insistence upon Lie for the Secretary-Generalship of the United Nations has been amply rewarded by his conduct of that high office.

As Secretary-General, Trygve Lie has the power to select all employees of the U. N., to control its finances and to execute its decisions. U. N. employees are hired on the basis of a personal interview, and a written examination. "We don't ask a person what his politics are and we don't care," said Basil Capella, U. N. personnel director, according to the Communist *Daily Worker* of March 28, 1946. The *Daily Worker* added: "Unlike the U. S. civil service, the United Nations isn't interested in a person's political belief or in labor or political activities usually called 'red' by U. S. witch-hunting Congressional committees."

In accordance with his powers, Lie selected his own staff of Assistant Secretaries-General, the eight officers who head the entire secretariat of 2,600 per-

sons. Of the eight, three are of known Russian sympathies.

To the most important post on his staff, Assistant Secretary-General for Security Council Affairs, Lie invited the Russian Arkady A. Sobolev. In this pivotal position Sobolev acts as liaison officer for the Council. To him come the world's territorial, military and juridical disputes for documentation. Thus after having served Stalin faithfully in Moscow and in the Soviet Embassy in London, Sobolev is now able to perform wider functions for his masters. He had much to do with the hiring of U. N. personnel.

Lie's Assistant Secretary-General for Social Affairs is the Frenchman Henri Laugier, a Socialist with strong Communist leanings. In 1944 he was the vice-president of *Rapprochement Franco-Soviétique*, an organization similar to our own National Council of American-Soviet Friendship. Lie's Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs is Dr. Ivan Kerno, of Czechoslovakia, a Soviet satellite—as the world learned when that country, on Stalin's instructions, had to retract its acceptance of the invitation to join free Europe in the conference growing out of the Marshall Plan. Kerno has already addressed the pro-Communist National Lawyers Guild.

In addition to these three Assistant Secretaries-General, Lie appointed pro-Soviet Abraham Feller as General Counsel and Director of the Legal Department of the United Nations Secretariat. Feller's Russian sympathies are well known to his associates. He has been a member of the Committee on International Law of the National Lawyers Guild, which was repudiated as Communist-controlled by such liberal attorneys as Frank P. Walsh, Morris Ernst, Ferdinand Pecora and Robert Jackson. Feller was also a member of the Wash-

ington Committee for Democratic Action, which defended civil service employees charged with subversive activities, and which was itself cited as subversive by Attorney General Francis Biddle.

In appointing his assistants Trygve Lie made one error which he later corrected. John B. Hutson, Assistant Secretary-General of Administrative and Financial Services, had the bad taste in May of 1946 to make a speech welcoming General T. Komorowski (General Bor) at a reception in his honor. Outlawed by the Soviet-oriented regime in Poland, General Bor had led the heroic Polish underground army which, in its Warsaw revolt against the Nazis, was first encouraged to fight and was then abandoned by the Russians. The Polish and Russian U.N. delegates immediately protested Hutson's conduct to Trygve Lie. Less than a month later the Secretary-General "reorganized" his staff, and Hutson resigned.

These were only the preliminary moves of the genial Norwegian who calls himself the "servant of the world." Such a servant finds himself in a difficult position as both the East and West beckon him from opposite sides of the ideological map. Yet impartiality is made even more important by this deep cleavage. A review of Lie's record in the U. N. shows that on the U. N. menu the items approved by Moscow have been served up promptly from the Secretary-General's kitchen, while the dishes favored by other customers have been given less generous treatment.

THE KEY to Trygve Lie's allegiance is not so much his positive acts, but rather his omissions, which have been more significant if less obvious.

Article 99 of the U. N. Charter states: "The Secretary-General may

bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security." In exercising this privilege, Lie has clearly revealed his loyalties, for he has been quick to put the U. N. machinery into motion in the direction indicated by the U.S.S.R.

Lie's first service to Stalin occurred only three months after he took office. In April of 1946 the Security Council was considering the Iranian issue, since Russia had failed to comply with the treaty requiring withdrawal of the Red Army from Iran and with subsequent instructions from the Security Council. The Soviet delegate, Gromyko, demanded that the issue be removed from the agenda, but he was opposed by most of the other delegates. Secretary-General Lie then offered the Council an unsolicited statement in which he showed that the body could not properly keep the case on its agenda. A committee of experts to which his letter was referred, disagreed with the Secretary-General, however, although three of the eleven members (those representing the U.S.S.R., Poland and France) took the same position as Lie. The Council did not take the advice of its Secretary-General, with the result that today its handling of the Iranian issue stands out as one of its few successes.

One of the U.S.S.R.'s main policies in international affairs is to achieve a world diplomatic break of relations with the Franco government of Spain. However much Franco may deserve the condemnation of the United Nations, this particular method of dealing with him is the Soviet's pet idea, and Lie has frequently indicated his approval. In his 1947 report, he deplored the fact that the problem was not "satisfactorily resolved." He neglected to point out, however, that

the Soviet delegate had used the veto power three times in one day in order to prevent the Security Council from taking any action against Franco except the Soviet plan of a break in relations.

But Secretary-General Lie has not been so hesitant in slapping Uncle Sam around. Last March he told the Security Council that the U. N. will succeed only if all countries "resort to the U. N. even when the most vital national issues are at stake"—an obvious rebuke to the United States for its Truman Doctrine.

Although willing to scold the United States or Britain every now and then, Trygve Lie is much more circumspect in his remarks that might not go well with the Russians. He did nothing to urge Russian participation in the sessions of the U.N. Trusteeship Council. He took no action on his own initiative regarding the invasion of Greece by Soviet-controlled Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. He said nothing about the faked elections in Poland, Rumania and Hungary, or about the deportation of Poles, Lithuanians and Estonians to Soviet slave labor camps. He did not use his power in the Security Council when Tito's soldiers shot down American planes over Yugoslavia. He has not called the attention of the Security Council to the civil war fomented in China by the Communists with the aid of the Soviet Union.

When the Secretary-General travels, he is the authorized representative of the United Nations as a whole. During his tour of Central America last January, his official welcome from the various governments included receptions by President Aleman of Mexico and dictator Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. Somewhat surprising, however, was the tribute paid to Lie in Panama by the local Communist group, the *Partido del Pueblo*, who held a rally in honor of

the Secretary-General and his visit to Panama. Well-known Communist figures spoke, including Rivera Reyes, Cristobal L. Segundo and Celso Solano. Solano closed the meeting by asserting the firm determination of the *Partido del Pueblo* to fight for the termination of racial discrimination in the Canal Zone which, he said, was sustained by "Yankee imperialism" despite Panamanian objections. He also spoke of the "flagrant violation" by the U. S. Army, in occupation of portions of Panamanian soil, of treaties concerning defense sites.

Ostensibly to speed his return to New York, Lie cancelled a visit to Puerto Rico, which had been next on his itinerary. This decision has been seen as a move to avoid a demonstration by the Puerto Rican *Independentistas*. Though not primarily Communist, this group agitates for the independence of Puerto Rico, a line followed by Communists all over the world. It is possible that Lie may have been warned following the tribute to him in Panama; and became wary of another demonstration which might have been construed as pro-Communist and anti-United States.

JUST AS the Trotsky incident stands out in Trygve Lie's pre-U. N. career of service to the Soviet Union, so his appointments to the secretariat of the Commission to investigate the current Balkan warfare stands out as the greatest service to Russia thus far in his career as a U. N. diplomat.

In December of 1946 the Security Council appointed a group of eleven men from eleven nations to probe the warfare in Greece, at the borders of Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, all Soviet satellites. The secretariat, appointed to aid the Commission, had seventy-five members, in the selection of which Soviet citizen Arkady Sobolev had vir-

tually complete freedom—granted by Secretary-General Lie. Sobolev had the crudeness to select a Ukrainian as secretary, but when the matter was brought to Trygve Lie after British protests, he showed his greater finesse by appointing instead his special adviser and friend, the Norwegian Colonel Roscher Lund. The Colonel was less obviously pro-Russian, but appeared faithful nevertheless. According to Joseph Alsop, he "is believed by a good many competent observers to have intimate Soviet connections." Lund's deputy was Gustav Gotesman, a Pole about whose loyalties there could be no doubt. The press section was headed by Stanley Ryan, born in Russia, who showed his intense pro-Soviet sympathies.

The Balkan Investigating Commission did a good job under difficult conditions. For example, Yugoslavia and Albania refused to admit a subsidiary group sent there by the Commission in May. The secretariat acted in a similar way, obstructing the work of the Commission at various points.

According to F. A. Voigt, independent British editor, writing in *The New Leader*:

"The Secretariat was, in effect, a Communist cell, and did all in its power to vitiate the task of the Commission." Voigt reports that when the Commission held its first meeting, the EAM, Communist-controlled political group, demonstrated outside. "Colonel Lund," he adds, "stepped on the balcony and addressed the demonstration."

Voigt also states that the secretariat dealt with EAM "as though it were a sovereign state." The secretariat, deciding what petitions and delegations were to be received by the Commission, received them only from groups hostile to the government of Greece for the first two weeks of the investigation. The

real work of the Commission was delayed by the admission of propagandists who read long statements and the postponement of the testimony of other groups and persons whose views showed greater independence. Voigt estimates that these tactics delayed the Commission for about a month, giving the Soviet satellites on the Greek borders that much time to remove the evidence of their aggression.

One member of the secretariat, an interpreter, was so pro-Soviet that he actually deserted the Commission during its work and joined the Greek guerrillas who were being aided by the Russian-dominated countries on the North. Documents and important evidence disappeared from Commission members' files, while secret reports not released for publication were spread over the pages of Balkan Communist newspapers.

One authenticated incident reveals the kind of sabotage that was exercised against the Commission. Returning members, according to Phelps Adams in *The New York Sun*, told the story behind the Commission's rebuke to the Greek Government for having executed two political prisoners in spite of a request to delay carrying out of the sentence. The Commission had sent this request twenty-four hours earlier, but it did not reach the government in time to prevent the execution.

An investigation later showed that the very member of the secretariat who had

demanding the passage of the resolution denouncing the execution had deliberately caused it by delaying the transmission of the Commission's request until it was too late to be effective.

Under fire for the secretariat's activities, Trygve Lie sent a personal adviser to investigate the charges that it had not been impartial. In a press interview on April 22, the Secretary-General dismissed as "hallucinations" certain newspaper reports that U. N. employees tampered with documents, but he admitted that a suitcase full of papers had disappeared while the Commission was en route from Greece to Geneva.

As the *Washington Daily News* pointed out in an editorial, full responsibility for the conduct of the secretariat of the Balkan Investigating Commission rests on Trygve Lie:

"He could have selected the Commission's staff from nationalities in no way involved in the Balkan dispute. It is difficult to dismiss his failure to do this as a mere error of judgment. The head of the Commission's secretariat, a personal friend of Mr. Lie's, is the principal target of the present charges. The Secretary-General certainly should have known his views. Mr. Lie's own activities have not reflected the objectivity to be desired of a man in his position. . . ."

Despite Trygve Lie's record to date in the U.N., it should be borne in mind that he still has another three years to serve as Secretary-General.

Coming in the November issue

DIPLOMACY AND STALIN'S WATERLOO

A provocative article by Isaac Don Levine which you will not want to miss, showing how our diplomacy can bring Stalin to his knees without resorting to measures of war.

OUR STUDENT COMES OF AGE

By ANDREW LUND

THAT THE American student has come of age was proved when 700 students from 400 colleges met August 30-September 8, at the University of Wisconsin to found the National Student Association (NSA). The convention provided evidence that the students of today have come a long way from the gullibility and apathy of a decade ago.

Those who participated in the student movement of the thirties had the embittering experience of learning that the American student was politically naive and exploitable. They saw the Communists, behind such fronts as the American Youth Congress (AYC) and the American Student Union, lead the American student by the nose down the tortuous path of Soviet policy. But at the recent convention in Madison, the delegates showed themselves to be alert and politically sophisticated. The typical student leader of today is a liberal non-Communist, alive to Communist tactics and able and willing to cope with them. Further, the convention showed a new political maturity among the rank-and-file, elected directly from their student bodies.

In direct contrast to the AYC, which engaged in the widest scope of political activity, and contrary to the counsel of the Communists, the NSA has been established as a service organization representing students of all faiths and ideologies and acting only upon those issues which effect students as students. The delegates realized the limitations imposed upon them by their very status, and the inadvisability of duplicating the efforts of already existing student organ-

izations. The NSA will provide an influential force for the renovation and extension of our educational system, though it will not have a hand in local or national politics as an organization. There is no doubt, however, that the members as individuals will prove a fresh and vital force in American politics. A number of them are already engaged in political activity.

Borrowing a leaf from the Communists' book, the liberal students immediately began to hold caucuses, and kept up the fight for their principles both day and night. After several sleepless nights, some of them collapsed on the floor from sheer exhaustion. But after some recuperation, they kept going. Thus the familiar Communist technique of wearing down the opposition failed of its purpose.

For example, the convention ignored the Communists' counsel of haste and incaution in the matter of affiliation with the International Union of Students (IUS). Affiliation was approved because of the sincere desire to establish relationships with fellow-students abroad. But the convention was thoroughly aware of the Communist control of the IUS and thus imposed as prerequisites to affiliation, stringent conditions of autonomy of policy and action and means for immediate disaffiliation. Affiliation will be on a provisional basis until voted upon next summer, then ratified by at least half the member colleges.

By the time the election of officers came up, the Communists had been thoroughly suppressed. They offered only one candidate, Walter Wallace, a

Negro student from Columbia University, who has shown a constant disposition to allow himself to be used as a front. He withdrew after being nominated. Russ Austin, who had previously been the leader of the pro-Communist contingent, was so thoroughly marked and discredited that he was able to do little more than twiddle his thumbs after the first day of the convention. There was some caucusing directed toward securing a slate which would not be reactionary and which would be representative of all faiths, races and regions.

The Communists, by virtue of the fact that they hold office in some of the regions, did secure two representatives on the executive committee of 31, which is composed of the officers plus chairmen of each region. The five officers elected are all non-Communist liberals. The president, William Welsh, lives in Maine and attends Berea College, Kentucky. Robert Smith of Yale University is vice-president for international affairs, and Ralph Dungan, a liberal Catholic from St. Joseph's College, is vice-president for national affairs. Janis Tremper of Rockford College, Illinois, is secretary. The treasurer, Leeland Jones of Buffalo University, a Negro with a brilliant record, serves on the Mayor's Advisory Council in his city. The officers, with an average age of 25, are more mature than leaders of student movements in the past.

Though comprising some 36 per cent of the delegates, the Catholic bloc offered only one candidate. It had a decisive influence on the defeat of the fellow-travelers, and frequently added its strength to that of the non-Catholic liberals, who made up a well-organized group of about 15 per cent of the convention. This was the first time that the Catholics formed a bloc within the American student movement. Their rec-

ord in general at Madison was that of a progressive force, which was decisive in checkmating the 10 per cent of the delegates who were in the Communist fold.

AT THE beginning of the convention, when there was a genuine fear of Communist domination, the delegates considered the issue of whether or not the NSA should extend membership in any form to the already existing student organizations. The decision that there be no organic connection passed by an overwhelming majority. Chief among the reasons offered upon the floor for the action taken was that existing student organizations have too many special axes to grind, and that any connection with them would be the opening wedge for Communist domination.

Now that the delegates have evidence of their ability to defeat the Communists, it is possible that this stand will be reversed in the next convention. Many felt the need for coordination of activities between the NSA and other student groups.

A storm over the race issue broke in the middle of the conference. For a while it looked as though this might wreck the whole organization.

At the first meeting of the panel which dealt with the issue, a compromise statement on discrimination and segregation was agreed upon. That night a caucus of Southerners, both Negroes and whites, supported the compromise statement. But the next morning the Communists went to work. Dr. Jeremiah Stamler, left-wing delegate of the Association of Internes and Medical Students, started talking to the Negro delegates, developing a feeling of dissatisfaction and resentment among them. In the afternoon a small minority, some of whom were running for the state legislature in the south and wanted to be

able to report that they had forced a major concession on the race issue from the convention, took a hand. This group was able to persuade a caucus of Southern whites to withdraw their support of the original compromise.

The situation was tailor-made for the Communists, who collared every Negro delegate and subjected him to intensive pressure. Presenting themselves as the Negroes' only true friends, they claimed that the Negroes must fight for the most extreme position, else get something less than the original compromise. For the moment the Communists pushed both minorities to extreme positions.

That afternoon a group of liberals led by the delegates from Students for Democratic Action stepped into the breach in support of the original compromise. Their task involved speaking to each Negro delegate, only to turn around and find pro-Communist delegates trying to undo their work. Yet that evening the caucus of Negro delegates backed the original compromise with only three dissenting votes.

The Communists continued their sabotage. The next morning a mysterious watered-down compromise was presented. The Communists seized upon it as evidence that the groups which had pledged themselves to support the original formula had broken faith. Once more there was a fight to reform the lines. At a steering committee meeting, the Southern whites maintained a filibuster, but a compromise was finally reached after an all-night session.

When the convention met to take final action upon the issue, the delegates were tense and on edge. Then John Simons, Catholic student from Fordham, gave the most eloquent speech of the convention in defense of the brother-

hood of man. His speech set the tone for the proceedings. The compromise passed with few dissenting votes.

As the tension broke, there was thunderous applause. A recess was called and the delegates gathered around pianos, singing and dancing. Neither the Communists nor the minority of the Southern group had succeeded in splitting the convention. The Southern Negroes had displayed their basic maturity in a dramatic issue.

FEW OF US will ever forget the innovations of the Communists or the selfish aims that motivated their unscrupulous actions. And those who had wondered about the loyalties of Young PCA (student group of the Progressive Citizens of America) will not forget that group's open collaboration with the American Youth for Democracy and the avowed Communist Party delegates, particularly on this issue.

One of the main reasons for the maturity of American students today, as represented at the Madison convention, is that many of them are veterans who are alert to totalitarian wiles and to the need for new safeguards to popular government. Before they leave our universities, the present student leaders must realize their responsibility to train their successors, who will be younger than themselves in years and experience. Otherwise this era of maturity may be short-lived.

The NSA must continue to be on guard against Communist strategy, which will now probably take one of two forms—an attempt to wreck the organization they cannot control, or to gain control of it through the exploitation of apathetic and poorly organized campuses.

MOLOTOV'S NEWEST BLUFF

By ALEXANDER SZÁSZ

Former Financial Counselor of the Hungarian Legation in Washington

WILL THE Molotov Plan succeed in speeding up the recovery of eastern Europe, ostensibly without dollar help, before the Marshall Plan shows real results? Russia wants to show the world that the Soviet system can achieve much greater results than the democratic regimes, in spite of the enormous difference in wealth and resources. The Kremlin will employ its cleverest propaganda tricks to make its plan for economic aid appear to be efficient.

Mr. Molotov went to Paris with the precalculated decision not to participate in the preparation of an overall European plan of recovery with American assistance. His only aim was to use this opportunity to attack the Marshall Plan publicly and to accuse the United States of "this new version of ruthless dollar diplomacy." In this instance Molotov did not have to resort to his customary obstruction pattern. He was aiming at something bigger.

Even in the absence of Soviet obstruction, the Western powers will encounter many snags in their reconstruction work in western Europe. The Soviets count on the fact that the conflicting interests of the democratic countries will make it difficult for them to solve such controversial problems as the coal production of the Ruhr Valley or the question of increasing German industrial production. They know that putting the Marshall Plan into effect will be a rather slow process, for satisfactory democratic solutions can be reached only after careful consideration of all aspects of the problems that arise.

We should therefore be prepared to hear soon of rapid recovery in eastern

Europe. We may be sure it will be achieved against the natural interests of the people, for the Soviets will not hesitate to make full use of totalitarian methods to carry out their plans. They will force their master blueprint on the individual countries.

It may be predicted that figures will shortly be published showing wide and rapid progress in the reconstruction of Soviet-dominated areas. However, the spectacular results claimed will be based on transparent fallacies. Such "progress" will not mean a healthy revival of the economy of the countries concerned. It will, rather, be a forced increase in the output of certain industries, mainly those most essential for integrating the country into the Soviet economic system, and those which serve the selfish interests of the Communist movement within each country. Another main fallacy lies in the standard of living in eastern Europe—always low as compared with that of the Western Hemisphere and at an unprecedented low since the war. Under such circumstances it does not take much to improve living conditions—especially if such improvements affect only those groups favored by the Communist-dominated regime at the expense of the others.

A comparatively good crop will provide most of the improvement; the amazing working spirit of the people in some of these countries will be responsible for the rest. No doubt, the Soviets will also claim credit for progress in such countries in their sphere as Czechoslovakia, where comparatively small war damage and/or huge UNRRA aid have made quicker recovery possible.

IS PROFIT SHARING A SOLUTION?

LAST JUNE a group of progressive industrialists and labor experts met in Cleveland to discuss the formation of a national council of profit sharing industries. In the middle of this month a convention is scheduled to be held in the same city to launch an organization dedicated to the promotion of profit sharing. Although American experience in profit sharing goes back to the beginnings of the Republic, this is the first attempt to give it the character of a social movement.

Ever since 1794, when Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury under Jefferson and Madison, introduced profit sharing in his own glass works in New Geneva, Pennsylvania, there have been various forms of it in operation in the United States. Mr. Gallatin himself promoted profit sharing on the ground that "the democratic principle upon which this Nation was founded should not be restricted to the political processes, but should be applied to industry."

That there has been "a vast voluntary experimentation with various types of profit sharing which demonstrates the existence of widespread social-mindedness in American business" was one of the conclusions arrived at by a Senate subcommittee which, in 1938, conducted a public investigation of the profit shar-

ing systems between employers and employees operating in the country.

"We have found veritable industrial islands of 'peace, equity, efficiency and contentment,' and likewise prosperity," declared the report of the survey of which Senator Vandenberg was a leading sponsor, "dotting an otherwise and relatively turbulent industrial map, all the way across the continent. This fact is too significant of profit sharing's possibilities to be ignored or depreciated in our national quest for greater stability and greater democracy in industry."

For about a century now the quest of a panacea for social disorders arising out of the industrial revolution has been the almost exclusive preserve of the exponents of the class struggle. Regarding profit sharing not as an end in itself but as a means to an end, its American advocates do not view it as an all-encompassing panacea for our industrial and economic ills. Rather do they urge it as a vital stabilizer of a progressive society, through the participation in the capitalistic profit system by the largest possible number of citizens.

Is profit sharing a solution to the problem of capital-labor relations? In line with our announced policy to explore every constructive avenue toward a sane and peaceful and cooperative social order, we shall open our columns to a free discussion of profit sharing as well as of other tested American ways to a better world. I.D.L.

*The ex-President of the United Automobile Workers, CIO, now
President of the Alliance for the Promotion of Profit Sharing*

HOMER MARTIN

contributes a challenging and highly informative article on

Profit Sharing: Key to Industrial Peace

in PLAIN TALK for November

HE WELCOMED WALLACE

By KURT SINGER

THE MAN who greeted Henry A. Wallace when he alighted at the Paris airport on his speaking tour last spring, has an unobtrusive appearance. Jacques Duclos is 51 years old and not much over five feet tall, with thinning hair, a round, plumpish face, wide-rimmed eyeglasses and a small moustache. He looks like what the French call a *petit bourgeois*, an ordinary little middle-class man. Like Gerhardt Eisler, the Soviet agent, who was recently convicted for passport falsification in the United States, Duclos has the disarming appearance of a bank teller or a department store clerk.

But the mouthpiece of world communism, Jacques Duclos, holds an important Comintern post—that of transmission belt between the Kremlin and the Communist forces throughout the Western Hemisphere. His name was practically unknown in America before May, 1945, when the *Daily Worker* published the famous Duclos letter, which resulted in the ousting of Earl Browder as chief of the U. S. Communists. It was Duclos whom Stalin chose to enunciate the new militant Communist policy, which replaced the line of cooperation followed during the war. In the official organ of the French Communist Party, Duclos had publicly condemned Browder for collaborating with the capitalists.

Though the Duclos message came as a shock to the American Communists, they soon made the required adjustment, and one of their leaders, Eugene Dennis, declared: "Aided by the wise and invaluable counsel of Comrade Duclos, we have begun to overcome our mistakes

and correctly to reorientate ourselves."

In the months that followed, the name of Duclos became more familiar to the world. We heard of Duclos meeting Tito in Moscow, of his secret trip to Germany to confer with the Prussian Communists, Wilhelm Pieck and Walter Ulbricht, and his announcement that France would annex the Saar.

What is the background of the Parisian *petit bourgeois* who ranks high in the powerful network of the supposedly dissolved Communist International? Duclos was born of a farm family, left school at the age of 12 and was apprenticed to a baker. While a prisoner of war in Germany in 1917, he heard of the Russian Revolution and the story appealed to his interest in socialism and anti-militarism. Returning to France, he became a crusader for Leninism and a paid official of France's new Communist Party. In 1935, after several trips to Russia, he was appointed a member of the executive board of the Comintern.

The Communists sent him to Parliament as their candidate from the Seine District from 1926 to 1932. There he followed the current party plan of undermining French military power at home and in the colonies, voting against defense measures up to the time when the *Front Populaire*, a united front of Socialists and Communists, signed a friendship pact with the Soviet Union. Duclos was re-elected to Parliament in 1935 under the United Front government. Shortly after the disastrous Munich pact, he organized the Communist-front World Peace Conference.

As late as the first half of 1940, this man, who today poses as a French super-

nationalist, preached the doctrine of neutrality and appeasement which Moscow imposed on Communists everywhere. Only after the Nazis had invaded France and the Vichy Government had outlawed the French Communist Party did he issue an order to "fight for France." But Duclos made it clear to his followers that they were to use the underground movement as a springboard for the eventual creation of a Soviet Republic of France, just as Tito was doing in Yugoslavia. In every village, town and city of France, Communists were entrenched in positions of power in preparation for the war's end.

After the war, with Duclos' guidance, such Comintern movements as the World Federation of Trade Unions and the Women's International Democratic Federation, originating in Paris, and the World Federation of Democratic Youth, originating in London, have sprung up. Duclos is known to have met Molotov on several occasions to discuss the fate of the Rhine, Ruhr and Saar areas. He attended the Pan-Slav Congress in Belgrade, and again in Moscow.

Duclos is reported to have sponsored the training in the south of France of the new International Brigade, which was prepared to join the civil warfare in Greece on the Yugoslav-Albanian borders under the leadership of Zachariades. The latter recently attended the Communist strategy conference at Strasbourg in Duclos' France.

WITHOUT HIS extensive interests abroad, the activities of Duclos in his own country would be sinister enough. He is a vice-president of the French Assembly and secretary of the Communist Party of France. While Maurice Thorez is the man of action in French communism, Duclos is its theoretician and intellectual leader.

By forcing the appointment of one of his closest friends, Marcel Paul, as Minister of Industrial Production, Duclos secured a grip on French industry. Then Duclos sent his best organizers into the *Confédération Générale du Travail* (CGT), a moderate trade union which before the war had been controlled by the Social Democrats. Communists now control its executive posts. The CGT was forced to accept a Communist co-chairman, Benoit Franchon, who is notorious as a strike organizer. Yet Duclos in Parliament and in his messages to industry continues to protest: "We want to reconstruct France, and there will be no general strike."

Today the French Communist Party has only 169 deputies out of a total of 618, but with its phenomenal control system, Duclos is still one of the most powerful men in France. This double-tongued leader of French communism insists that all he wants is "democracy for France." But to the one million registered members of his party, he tells a different story.

On March 20, 1946, in a speech at the Marigny Theater in Paris, Duclos declared: "And this evening may I tell you officially, in the name of our party, that if the people so order us, we are ready to take the helm of the nation into our hands."

Like Tito in Yugoslavia, Dimitrov in Bulgaria, Ana Pauker in Rumania and Gottwald in Czechoslovakia, Duclos is looking forward to the subjugation of France to the dictates of Russian communism. Every one of those old friends of his, like Duclos himself, was a member of the executive committee of the Communist International. Now every one has become the boss of a Soviet satellite nation.

The Frenchman who met Henry Wallace at the airport is waiting . . .

FLAWS IN THE MARSHALL PLAN

By HENRY HAZLITT

We are indebted to Mr. Leonard E. Read, president of the Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York, for permission to publish in part Mr. Henry Hazlitt's brilliant study of the Marshall Plan. The section here reproduced deals with but one aspect of Mr. Hazlitt's many-sided and comprehensive analysis entitled "Can America Rescue the World?" Scheduled to appear under the auspices of the Foundation, Mr. Hazlitt's manuscript in preliminary draft has already aroused deep interest

PLEASE SEND A PLAIN TALK SUBSCRIPTION...

TO:

NAME.....

ADDRESS.....

CITY..... ZONE..... STATE.....

FROM:

NAME.....

ADDRESS.....

CITY..... ZONE..... STATE.....

☐ ALSO INCLUDE MY OWN SUBSCRIPTION

☐ PLEASE BILL ME ☐ REMITTANCE ENCLOSED

Subscription

Rates—

☐ 1-year \$3.00

☐ 2-years..... \$5.00

☐ 3-years..... \$7.00

(Add \$1.00 for Postage
to foreign countries)

107

PLAIN TALK

240 Madison Ave.

New York 16, N.Y.

only way to halt the spread of communism" and that, if we allow Europe simply to stew in its own juice, it will surely go communistic. This is usually accompanied by the argument that if our loans, however large, succeed in stopping communism, or in reversing the trend to it, they will have proved very cheap.

This is a peculiarly difficult argument to analyze, because it leaves so many questions unanswered, and because the factors it deals with are so numerous and difficult to weigh. In its usual

adding to the military strength of the countries threatened by it.

It is obvious that we have more than one question to deal with here. We have on the one hand the question of what is the most effective means to combat the Communist ideology. We have on the other hand the question of what is the most effective means of curbing further Russian aggression which rests on Russian military power. The two questions are connected, but they are certainly not identical. The two

nationalist, preached the doctrine of neutrality and appeasement which Moscow imposed on Communists everywhere. Only after the Nazis had invaded France and the Vichy Government had outlawed the French Communist Party did he issue an order to "fight for France." But Duclos made it clear to his followers that they were to use the underground movement as a springboard for the eventual creation of a Soviet Republic of France just as

By forcing the appointment of one of his closest friends, Marcel Paul, as Minister of Industrial Production, Duclos secured a grip on French industry. Then Duclos sent his best organizers into the *Confédération Générale du Travail* (CGT), a moderate trade union which before the war had been controlled by the Social Democrats. Communists now control its executive posts. The CGT was forced to accept a Communist chairman. Pierre Baudouin



BUSINESS REPLY CARD

First Class Permit No. 47485 Sec. 510, P. L. & R., New York, N.Y.

PLAIN TALK

240 MADISON AVE.

NEW YORK 16, N. Y.

ariades. The latter recently attended the Communist strategy conference at Strasbourg in Duclos' France.

WITHOUT HIS extensive interests abroad, the activities of Duclos in his own country would be sinister enough. He is a vice-president of the French Assembly and secretary of the Communist Party of France. While Maurice Thorez is the man of action in French communism, Duclos is its theoretician and intellectual leader.

Like Tito in Yugoslavia, Dimitrov in Bulgaria, Ana Pauker in Rumania and Gottwald in Czechoslovakia, Duclos is looking forward to the subjugation of France to the dictates of Russian communism. Every one of those old friends of his, like Duclos himself, was a member of the executive committee of the Communist International. Now every one has become the boss of a Soviet satellite nation.

The Frenchman who met Henry Wallace at the airport is waiting . . .

FLAWS IN THE MARSHALL PLAN

By HENRY HAZLITT

We are indebted to Mr. Leonard E. Read, president of the Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson, New York, for permission to publish in part Mr. Henry Hazlitt's brilliant study of the Marshall Plan. The section here reproduced deals with but one aspect of Mr. Hazlitt's many-sided and comprehensive analysis entitled "Can America Rescue the World?" Scheduled to appear under the auspices of the Foundation, Mr. Hazlitt's manuscript in preliminary draft has already aroused deep interest among economists. Our own position is that so long as the Red Army occupies countries outside Russia, no permanent recovery is possible in Europe; first of all, political measures can and must be devised to send the Soviet forces back to Russia's legitimate borders.

THERE IS a widespread belief that the United States has a duty to lend or give huge sums to other countries, principally in Europe, if it is to save the world from communism and chaos. This belief is held almost as strongly in the United States, which would make the sacrifices, as it is in the European countries that would benefit from them.

The plain truth is that making heavy loans or gifts to European nations is not the most effective way to fight world communism.

There is one argument for our policy of making huge loans and gifts abroad that appeals especially to American conservatives. It is that this policy is the only way to "halt the spread of communism" and that, if we allow Europe simply to stew in its own juice, it will surely go communistic. This is usually accompanied by the argument that if our loans, however large, succeed in stopping communism, or in reversing the trend to it, they will have proved very cheap.

This is a peculiarly difficult argument to analyze, because it leaves so many questions unanswered, and because the factors it deals with are so numerous and difficult to weigh. In its usual

form, the argument begs the question. It simply *takes it for granted* that loans to Europe will stop communism.

Just how it will stop it is seldom explained. The mere *intention* on our part that the loans should be used to combat communism is commonly taken as an assurance that they will actually have that effect. The loans, it is apparently assumed, will make the recipient governments friendly and grateful to us; and by supporting them, by keeping them on their feet, and by preventing starvation, we will make the Communist ideology in those countries wane or die. Sometimes the loans, like those to Greece and Turkey, are deliberately intended to combat Russian aggression by adding to the military strength of the countries threatened by it.

It is obvious that we have more than one question to deal with here. We have on the one hand the question of what is the most effective means to combat the Communist ideology. We have on the other hand the question of what is the most effective means of curbing further Russian aggression which rests on Russian military power. The two questions are connected, but they are certainly not identical. The two

ends require different means, though to the extent that we succeed in one it will of course help us with the other.

Clearly the burden of proof ought to rest on those who contend that making loans or gifts to Europe is the most effective means of combatting the Communist ideology. At most, as others have already pointed out, loans could be only a limited and temporary means for combatting the spread of revolutionary ideas. And it would certainly seem at first glance much more effective, and incomparably cheaper, for our government to do this directly. It could do it directly by answering systematically the lies that are published in Moscow and in the Communist press about American intentions and about the working of the capitalist system. It would seem better directly to expound the merits of that system and to point to the starvation, terror, and slavery under communism.

The common argument that capitalism must provide even more goods than it is already providing in order to prove its "superiority" over communism is complete nonsense. The comparison is already so enormously in capitalism's favor that no further demonstration of this superiority is needed. What is needed is to point out how great this superiority already is.

It may be doubted whether our government, or any government, is the best instrument for this counter-propaganda in favor of capitalism. It is obvious that most of those in our government do not know what the real arguments for capitalism, and against communism, really are. Their so-called defense of capitalism is usually apologetic. They are nearly always defending some other kind of capitalism than the kind we actually have; they are defending their own version of what a "reformed"

capitalism, in accordance with their particular interventionist ideas, would be like.

BUT IF the American Government cannot be counted upon as the ideal defender of capitalism or the ideal critic of communism, neither, certainly, can most European governments to which our loans are being and would be made. Practically all these governments consist of "economic planners," that is, people who believe in a dictated economy, and who in a hundred ways are making it impossible for capitalism to function within their borders. Some of these governments consist of outright Socialists, who do not believe in capitalism at all.

And there could hardly be a more perverse and mistaken idea than the idea that you can fight communism with socialism. So-called "gradual" socialism is at best a halfway step toward communism. The economic ideals of socialism and communism are identical. Both believe in government ownership and operation of the means of production. Wherever this exists the government has economic life-and-death powers over the individual. It can say where he must take his job, what job he must take, or whether he can take a job at all. And once the government has this say, the liberty of the individual has in fact, if not in form, disappeared. As Alexander Hamilton pointed out in the Federalist Papers a century and a half ago, "A power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will."

Socialism and communism differ only in their political ideals. The Socialists, it is true, believe in coming into power by peaceful means, through the ballot. But even Communists prefer a "peaceful" means wherever it is open to them. It is only where they cannot get into

power by peaceful intrigue that they resort to open force. The Socialists, it is true, talk of preserving the methods of democracy and the liberty of the individual, and most of them are no doubt sincere in their protestations. But they fail to recognize that in fact socialism does not and cannot permit economic liberty, and therefore in fact it must ultimately cease to permit any other important kind of liberty. A man's opinions must be such that they please the officials in power if he is to gain any promotion or even enjoy any security under socialism.

Under capitalism, in addition to the possibility of going into business for oneself, there are in the United States several million employers competing against each other for labor. Their competition not only raises the wages but protects the liberties of the worker. His situation becomes incomparably worse when he must bow to the will and terms of a single employer, the State. The history of the spread of socialism is in fact a history of the disappearance of peaceful democratic methods and personal liberty.

Moreover, when American funds are turned over to Socialist governments or to "planning" governments, recovery, as post-war experience has already shown, does not in fact take place. It is prevented by the very policies that these governments pursue. Yet the existence of the American funds has meanwhile made the dictated economy or socialism appear to work much better than it actually does. The loss of these funds by the United States, on the other hand, by promoting inflation and increasing the scarcity of goods here, appears to make our (comparative) capitalism work worse than it actually does.

Nevertheless, in spite of this help to the dictated or socialistic economies, the

borrowed funds continue to run out and the government is soon back for more. Meanwhile, however, the Communists have found an additional argument against the government that has failed to bring recovery. It has failed, they say triumphantly, not because it has adopted restrictive regulations and practiced socialism, but because its regulations have not been drastic enough and because its socialism has been partial and half-hearted.

ONCE MORE we return to the conclusion that our loans can do little good unless they are given in return for the most drastic economic reforms, and for the right reforms.

And once more we are brought back to the fact that it is not objective economic conditions, but the dominant ideology, which decides what course a nation will take. The belief that Europe will turn in desperation to communism unless it receives heavy financial help from our government rests on one or all of three assumptions. The first is that communism is more efficient than private enterprise in supplying at least the bare means of subsistence. The second is that free enterprise is in any case a luxury that only an already prosperous nation can afford. The third is that, regardless of the truth of the matter, hungry and desperate people always believe communism to be more efficient than free enterprise.

The first two assumptions are always false. The third is likely to be true only if Communist propaganda is allowed to monopolize the field, or if the case for private enterprise is presented apologetically or stupidly. In Russia today, according to a recent study by the United States Department of Labor, the average worker is only about one-tenth as well off as the American worker in

terms of what his wages will buy. Compared with a year ago the prices of rationed foodstuffs in Russia have risen about 166 per cent, while the Russian worker's wages have risen only 25 per cent. Would "hungry and desperate" men be eager to embrace communism if they were told such basic facts?

There remains to be considered the granting of frankly political loans, like those to Greece and Turkey, in order to support the military establishments of these countries and help them to combat any Russian or Russian-inspired effort at conquest or at a *coup d'état*. It is beyond the purpose of this study to pass upon the wisdom of these broader political aims. But it may be pointed out that if we are to adopt a policy of preventing or halting any Russian military advance or military coup, we must have the clarity and courage to see and accept the implications of such a policy.

Political loans can be only a part of it, and moreover only a subordinate part. It is worse than useless to give to countries threatened by Russian domination less than enough to resist the threat. The resources that we have contributed would then become part of Russian resources to be used against our interest. If a country to which we have granted such aid subsequently seems in danger nonetheless of being conquered or controlled by Russia, then we must not only pour in further aid, but stand ready even to use our own direct military force if the aid we have already given is not to be turned against us.

When we make frankly political loans for basically military reasons, in short, we must not keep ourselves willfully blind to the dangers of these loans. Above all, our policy must be consistent. It is merely a piece of diplomatic insanity to make military loans on the one hand to Greece and Turkey in order to

enable them to combat the threat of Russia, and then to turn around and beg Russia to come into a plan to accept loans from us for "economic rehabilitation" which would inevitably be used to maintain or increase her military strength. It is insane to strengthen Turkey to fight Russia and then strengthen Russia to fight Turkey. It would be flattering to say that the two policies cancel each other out. The combination would be far worse than futile. It would increase Russian hostility to us at the same time as it weakened us financially and denuded us of the goods that we had contributed.

THE FACT that Russia has spurned the invitation to participate in the Marshall Plan has, however, increased the popularity of that plan in the United States. If Communist Russia does not like it, it is thought, it must be good. If Russia fears it, then it must have been a very shrewd political move, and we should drive ahead with it.

But this is to ignore the reasons why Russia opposed the plan. She could have embarrassed us tremendously by hailing the plan, putting in a request for \$25,000,000,000 or so as her own share of America's largess; proposed that Europe adopt communism to insure recovery under the plan, or at the very least insisted that there must be no interference on our part with her communistic policies in exchange for our loan. Such tactics would have put Secretary Marshall in the dilemma either of having to offer Europe and Russia fantastic sums without even getting in return policies that might help recovery and world peace, or of turning down the plan and opening himself to the accusation of having made a fraudulent offer and welshed on it.

Instead of putting us in the dilemma

which the Marshall Plan invited, Communist Russia made the mistake of taking a dog-in-the-manger attitude which alienated her from the Western countries that were looking to us for outside help. This mistake was apparently made because of the propensity of the Russian leaders to ascribe to us the same kind of motives and tactics that inspire their own policies. It is Russian policy to give as little help as possible for as great control as possible.

If Russia had offered an equivalent of the Marshall Plan, the dominating purpose of the offer would have been an extension of Russian political control and influence. The Kremlin leaders therefore apparently took the Marshall Plan to be essentially a plan for increasing American dominance and prestige and alienating the satellite states from Russia. They attached so much importance to this danger that they threw away the opportunity of exploiting the Marshall Plan for their own purposes as they might have done. But as the Marshall Plan is in fact what it professes to be—an offer of large American resources in return for no controls whatever, and only for the conditions suggested by the borrowing nations themselves — the Russian suspicions hardly seem sufficiently warranted to justify unqualified endorsement of the Marshall Plan by Americans.

IT WILL BE *a profound mistake to count on gratitude, or to believe that we are purchasing any permanent goodwill by government loans and gifts to Europe.*

It should be sufficient to remind ourselves not only that we did not get such gratitude or goodwill from the Yugoslavian Government in return for the millions of dollars' worth of supplies poured into that country by

UNRRA, but that we did not get it from the Russian Government even in return for \$11,000,000,000 of Lend-Lease, extended at a time when it meant the very survival of Russia.

Nor is it from Communist-controlled countries alone that our financial help has failed to buy gratitude or good will. Passing over the effect in this direction of the \$30,000,000,000 of American Lend-Lease to Great Britain, the whole amount of which was written off, we need merely consider the response to the special post-war loan to Britain of \$3,750,000,000. Far from hearing continual grateful references to this in Parliament and in the British press, we hear constant resentment about its alleged "onerous" terms. A mere moderate requirement like sterling convertibility, though it was in Britain's own interest, was discussed months in advance as if it were an imposed disaster.

When the terms of the American loan to Britain were first announced, even the dignified London *Economist* wrote: "If the purpose of the American Congress which decides American policy is, as it often seems to be, deliberately to wound and afflict the British people, it has certainly succeeded. It is aggravating to find that our reward for losing a quarter of our national wealth in the common cause is to pay tribute for half a century to those who have been enriched by the war."

As late as July 19 of this year Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, appealed to the coal miners to keep Britain "out of the money-lenders' grip." The following week he said that this reference had been "misunderstood"; but he took this second opportunity to say that the value of the dollar loan to Britain had depreciated 30 per cent because of rising United States prices. This rise of prices was largely

caused, as Mr. Bevin failed to point out, by the very extensions of credit we had made to Britain and other countries, which meant that a world inflationary purchasing power was created to bid for the limited supply of American goods. But the implication of Mr. Bevin's remark was that America was profiteering at the expense of the European consumer.

One could continue to quote *ad libitum* such adverse European comments on the effect of our help. How, in the face of such a record, any Americans can still think that inter-governmental foreign loans buy the good will of the governments and people to whom they are made, passes understanding.

THOSE WHO oppose heavy extensions of credit and aid from our government to European governments are sometimes accused of being "isolationists." But it is those who believe that in place of government loans the barriers should be removed to private loans, and that our private lending markets should be freely opened up to foreign borrowers, who are the true internationalists. They see economic internationalism as the freedom of individuals in all lands to buy from and sell to each other, and to do all this without having to run to some nationalistic-minded government bureaucrat for a special license for each transaction.

It is a completely false internationalism that sees dealings between nations as primarily dealings between the governments of those nations, as dealings between different groups of nationalistic bureaucrats, each preventing their own citizens from buying in the cheapest market, selling where they can sell most profitably, lending where their capital can be wisely used and safeguarded.

It is a false internationalism which

can only interpret "international cooperation" as meaning that America must be the perpetual innocent *Candide* among nations, or must act toward other nations like a rather soft-headed Santa Claus.

It is a false internationalism that looks upon "cooperation" as a wholly one-sided affair in which one nation must give without having anything to say about how its gifts shall be used.

It is a false internationalism that ignores or represses the freedom of individuals in one nation to buy or sell, lend or borrow, or cooperate as they please with individuals in another nation.

It is a false internationalism that assumes it to be the responsibility of the government, rather than of the individual importer, to get the foreign exchange necessary to make his purchases.

Would there be more "cooperation among the states," or less, if New Jersey, instead of allowing its citizens to trade as they pleased with the citizens of New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio, decided that it was losing too many dollars to New York, put a ban on the export of dollars from New Jersey, put a ceiling on New Jersey imports from other states, subjected every import or export, and even every traveler outside of the state, to special license, and asked the Governor of New York to pass a law forcing every New York taxpayer to make a loan to New Jersey?

This sort of thing, which now parades as "international cooperation," and has the effrontery to call the advocates of a free world economic system "the New Isolationists," is not internationalism at all. Its true name is stateism. Its true goal is authoritarianism. Its true end is world impoverishment and the suppression of the liberty of the individual.

MILLION-DOLLAR BABY

A Play in One Act and One Page

Money from the Woolworth fortune found its way into the Civil Rights Congress via Frasier McCann, cousin of the former Barbara Hutton and grandson of F. W. Woolworth, founder of the chain. Mr. McCann, who is part owner of SALUTE Magazine, on two occasions gave "\$500 or more" to the Communist front. . . . The money thus collected is used by the CRC to foot the bills for the legal defense of Eugene Dennis, convicted general secretary of the Communist Party; Gerhardt Eisler, twice-convicted Moscow agent; Carl Marzani, convicted ex-State Department employee, and Leon Josephson, professed party member.

FREDERICK WOLTMAN, *New York World-Telegram*, Sept. 4, 1947

CAST OF CHARACTERS

FRASIER McCANN. Heir to the Woolworth Millions

SHADE OF HIS GRANDFATHER, F. W. WOOLWORTH

WOOLWORTH COMPANY PERSONNEL MANAGER

EUGENE DENNIS (*alias Waldron, etc.*) . . . General Secretary, U.S. Communist Party

GERHARDT EISLER (*alias Berger, etc.*) . . . Personal Envoy of Generalissimo Stalin

Scene is the financial offices of the F. W. Woolworth Co., Woolworth Bldg., N.Y. As the curtain rises, Frasier McCann is seen seated at a desk three sizes too large for him, in front of a still larger portrait of F. W. Woolworth. A knock is heard.

MCCANN: Come in. (*Woolworth personnel manager enters.*) What's bothering you now?

PERSONNEL MANAGER: It's those salesgirls. They're asking for another raise.

MCCANN: Again? Somebody must be circulating capitalist propaganda among them. What do they want now?

PERSONNEL MANAGER: Two dollars a week more.

MCCANN: Tell them it's impossible. I can't afford to give them any more. I have too many demands on me from the Party. Don't they realize that I am working for the good of the proletariat?

(*Exit Personnel Manager. Enter Eisler and Dennis without knocking.*)

EISLER and DENNIS: Heil Stalin! Good morning, Comrade. We have come for some more funds for the Civil Rights Congress.

MCCANN: I'll tell you how it is, Comrades. I'd like to give you more for the cause, but it would be rather difficult. I've just had to chip in with my brother-in-law to give a house to Arthur Upham Pope's Iranian Institute;

the salesgirls are demanding a raise; *Salute* costs me plenty, and you know what Cousin Barbara's weddings do to the family bankroll.

EISLER and DENNIS: It's very urgent, Comrade. We are both out on bail and need a few more grand for our attorneys to defeat the machinations of the Un-American Committee, Rankin, Dewey, Hoover and Truman. You must come across. Tell those salesgirls they'll get their reward in the sweet bye-and-bye, like the proletariat in the Soviet Union. We need the money now.

MCCANN: (*taking out checkbook and fountain pen*) O.K., Comrades. The pen is mightier than the sword! In the name of our Great Leader, let us battle against reaction!

(*Exit Eisler and Dennis, waving check and singing, "We Found a Million-Dollar Baby in a Five and Ten Cent Store," as Stalinist moustache, pipe and hammer-and-sickle suddenly sprout on the amazed portrait of Grandfather Woolworth. Curtain.*)

ALFRED KOHLBERG

ACID TEST FOR AVC

By RALPH DE TOLEDANO

THE NEW chairman of the American Veterans Committee (AVC), Chat Paterson, speaks "French, German, Spanish and Russian ably," according to his publicity. As one of the leaders of the anti-Communist forces in AVC, he should also be able to understand the Muscovite dialect spoken by the party-line phalanx which has been attempting to seize control of his organization.

What Paterson—and the majority of his followers in AVC—may not understand is that the substantial victory won over the Communists and fellow-travelers at the recent Milwaukee convention can, in effect, deliver AVC into the hands of the Russia Firsters and destroy what continues to be the most promising veterans' organization. This seeming paradox is nevertheless a truism to those who have applied a critical intelligence over a period of years to the problem of Communist infiltration.

The Milwaukee meeting witnessed the end of a battle which began when the Communist high command, through Veterans Affairs Director John Gates, decided to cease its futile attempts at penetrating the American Legion and to move into the young, inexperienced and idealistic AVC. The party line, until then, had been highly critical of AVC, but with the new orders came an overnight change, reflected in the *Daily Worker* and *Political Affairs*—both of which immediately bestowed the accolade of "progressive" on AVC.

In short order, AVC began to show the symptoms common to all organizations blessed by Communist infiltration: smear campaigns, whispering campaigns,

dissensions, squabbles, charges of "Fascist" and "reactionary" against its founders and leaders, resolutions and counter-resolutions. Its primary purposes—to give direction and a voice to veterans of World War II, to fight for liberal legislation—were forgotten in the scramble of the Communists and their fellow-stooges to seize control and to make AVC one more instrument of Stalin's foreign policy. Tactics of surprise and organization gave the party-liners an advantage, and soon New York City and State had fallen to them, as well as California and Michigan.

For a while it seemed as if the Communist infiltration would be successful. All attempts to stem it were branded as "Red-baiting" and black reaction. When a group in New York sought to block the use of the Metropolitan Area Council (MAC) as a sounding-board for every new front organization, there were loud shouts that this was undermining AVC and "playing into the hands of the enemy"—that hoariest of charges.

At AVC's 1946 national convention in Des Moines the Communist caucus, labeling itself "progressive," charged that the leadership was blocking "unity," and on the basis of these charges was able to elect a pro-Communist fraction to the National Planning Committee (NPC). This fraction, not strong enough to determine policy, was successful in making each meeting of NPC a bitter and futile struggle.

Urged by founders Charles Bolté and Gil Harrison, the NPC passed a resolution declaring communism incompatible with the principles of AVC, and bar-

ring Communists from membership. When this resolution was sent to the chapters for comment, a storm of protest was unleashed. However, it is significant that the party strategists realized sentiment was against them, so that in some cases observers were treated to the ludicrous spectacle of Communist support of anti-Communist policies.

In the year between Des Moines and Milwaukee, popular opposition to the Soviet Union increased as a result of Russia's actions in the Balkans, in Poland and in the United Nations. Non-Communists in the AVC were therefore able to speak openly, without the old fear of ruining their political fortunes. A liberal caucus was formed in opposition to the Communist caucus, and though it was handicapped by the spying and sabotage of numerous "plants" from the Communist faction, it organized with sufficient strength to overcome the usual inertia of democratic majorities.

The Independent Progressive caucus won hands down at Milwaukee. It elected the chairman, Chat Paterson, and an overwhelming majority of NPC. The delegates, who had sweated at all-night meetings to defeat the Communist secret battalion, felt that the war had been won, and that the future of AVC was secure. Weary but elated, they went home to build AVC into a strong and liberal mass organization.

BUT THOUGH the pro-Communist forces lost a battle, they have not been routed. They are still gambling on democratic apathy to win for them the final victory. They still have some heavy artillery on their side. Communism is an infectious disease, and right in the NPC they have several Typhoid Marys. Maurice Pottish, a New York stalwart whose record is one of complete sub-

servience to the pro-Communist caucus, retains his seat in the National Planning Committee. And with him are Archie Green of California—a so-called compromise candidate who believes in "unity," party-line style—and Michael Straight, the confused young publisher of the *New Republic*.

There is no question about Pottish's loyalties. Green is an innocent. But Straight still wears the cloak of liberalism. He calls himself anti-Communist, but the policies he sponsors could just as easily have come from the pro-Communist benches. Politically sophisticated, he can still demand that all aid to Europe be administered by the U.N. Aware of Russia's record of sabotage in the guise of "cooperation," he can still urge "that the U.S. work for four-power administration of Germany." Straight, Green and Pottish can do considerable damage to AVC.

However, the real strength of the pro-Communists lies in the local area councils, for there they are not dealing with informed and sophisticated leaders but with veterans fed up with politics and eager for the sort of action which will get them adequate housing, good jobs and a liberal Congress. These veterans were aroused once by the anti-Communist group, but now they are sure that they have finished with the Communists for good. And the Communists are appealing to them with redoubled diligence.

"Newsletters" have sprung up in Washington and elsewhere, making the usual snide charges against the new leaders and attempting to prove that there was hanky-panky in the Milwaukee convention. In New York, where the MAC executive committee is still party-dominated, there is an all-out push to take the leadership in the housing problem, to undermine the position of

the NPC, and to pose as the vanguard of true liberalism, opponents of the "machine politics" of the present AVC administration. In Washington, an *AVC Newsletter*, published in opposition to the *Capital Veteran*, has begun to spread malicious reports of the last convention.

While the democratic forces take their victory for granted, the pro-Communist caucus has begun to mend its fences, to tighten up its organization, and to work quietly for victory in 1948—before the crucial Presidential campaign. The battle was joined when Ken Pettus, a defeated candidate for chairman, "congratulated" Chat Paterson in an open letter published in the *AVC Bulletin*,

which has been characterized by informed AVCers as a "declaration of war."

The pro-democratic elements in AVC have, as Shakespeare said, "scotched the snake, not killed it." While they go complacently about their business, the snake is coiling itself to strike again.

Can AVC stand another year of attrition? Can it hold the new members who came in because they thought the Communist issue would no longer plague them? Unless the national leadership makes up its mind to face the problem squarely, unless it is willing to root out the Communists *now*, while it still has the strong backing of the membership, the answer will be *no*.

Arnulf Overland on Soviet "Democracy"

NORWAY'S GREATEST living poet, Arnulf Overland, who was the soul of the Norwegian National Resistance movement during the German occupation and politically is a representative of the Radical wing in the Norwegian Labor Party, recently addressed the students of Copenhagen University. "I have been told that it is not always opportune to speak the truth," were his first words, "but nothing will prevent me from expressing my deepest contempt for every political system based on censorship of the press, a secret police and concentration camps, regardless of whether this system styles itself as Nazi or Soviet democracy."

The speaker then said that the most inhuman penalty introduced by Nazism—the *collective imprisonment of a political opponent's family and relations*—had long been the rule in Soviet Russia. Idolatry of the Communist leaders is compulsory in literature and art. As an illustration he quoted some passages from a recent work by a Soviet author: "At that moment I saw our beloved Stalin and fainted" and "Oh, thou most powerful, who makest the earth put forth crops! Oh, thou sun, who art reflected in millions of hearts!" Overland concluded, "If this is Socialism, then I am no Socialist. When Socialism cannot win the approbation of the people in a free political struggle, then it does not deserve victory. When it cannot exist without violence, then it has no right to exist. We are not fighting for violence, but for freedom. Some people say we must reconcile ourselves to the existence of the Soviet Union, but this is not the question. *The question is, whether the Soviet Union will allow us to exist.*"

The Inside Story of

THE MARZANI CASE

By J. ANTHONY PANUCH

Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

The case of Carl Aldo Marzani, who went from General Donovan's wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS) into a highly confidential bureau of the State Department, makes an exciting true detective story. As unfolded here for the first time, the Marzani case dramatizes a crucial issue before the American people. Is suspicion of disloyalty on the part of a Federal employee sufficient ground for his dismissal? Does the burden of proof rest on the suspect who should establish his innocence or on the Federal Government which should establish his guilt? Is it a privilege or is it an inalienable right to be a civil servant? These are some of the aspects of the problem of dealing with subversive elements in the Government. Although convicted, Marzani is at this writing out on \$5,000 bail pending an appeal to the higher courts.

THE INSIDE STORY of the Marzani case can now be told. It provides a revealing insight into the problems confronting government administrators in coping with the menace of Communist infiltration, without wholesale violations of civil liberties and rudimentary standards of American decency and fair play.

The story begins in October of 1945 when Secretary of State James F. Byrnes appointed me Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Administration and at the same time designated me as coordinator of the merger with the Department of State of such war agencies as the Office of War Information (OWI), Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) and several others. This vast merger, involving close to 25,000 Federal employees, also funds and properties of these war agencies, had to be accomplished in less than ninety days—by January 1, 1946.

It was an homeric task. One of the principal jobs was the "screening" of the war agency personnel thus transferred to the Department of State, in order to determine their suitability

for employment in the highly confidential work of the Department. For this purpose the Department maintained a corps of trained investigators, under the experienced direction of Chief Special Agent Thomas F. Fitch.

Moreover, when Secretary Byrnes took office he found himself plagued with organizational difficulties in the investigative set-up of the Department, inherited from the preceding regime. One of these was a jurisdictional conflict between the office of Chief Special Agent Fitch and a newly-established three-man "security-office" under the energetic Bob Bannerman. The confusion resulting from this bit of bureaucratic politics did not help the Department's problem of screening the large numbers of transferee personnel.

The screening job became virtually desperate when the sudden and unexpected merger of 1946 literally dumped thousands of new employees on the Department. Carl Marzani was one of those thus transferred to the Department of State as a member of the Presentation Division of the OSS.

I MET Marzani early in November of 1946. At that time Col. Carter Burgess, formerly aide to Lt. Gen. Bedell Smith and wartime secretary of SHAEF, was Executive Officer to Mr. Donald Russell, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration and myself. Col. Burgess was working closely with me on a plan for the reorganization of the State Department's antiquated communications system. In this work we were being assisted by Maj. Gen. Otto Nelson, formerly Assistant to Gen. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff to Gen. Marshall.

As we wrestled with our complex task all of us agreed that what we urgently needed was a graphic presentation of the reorganization plan in operation. Accordingly we welcomed General Nelson's proposal that the Presentation Division, newly acquired by transfer from OSS, be assigned to take on the graphic display job. The General went on to explain that one of the best men in the Division and one who had worked with him in the War Department and in Italy would "do a job" for us. His name, Marzani. He phoned Marzani and asked him to come over.

In about a half-hour Marzani arrived. He was still wearing his sergeant's uniform with the patch and insignia of the Mediterranean Theater. He was of medium size, compactly built, with a sallow complexion and an unusual pair of hazel-brown eyes. His motions and mannerisms were quick and nervous, his facial expressions mobile. He spoke expressively, a sort of New Yorkese with an overlay of foreign accent. His response to our difficulties was swift and intelligent. He not only grasped and correctly appraised the complexities of the problem with which we were confronted, but came up quickly with his idea of how it could best be translated into graphic form. "Roughs," he said,

"would be in our hands in a week." And they were. Gen. Nelson, Col. Burgess and I were delighted with the concept of the proposed display.

In those hectic reorganization days of the winter of 1945-1946 the "front office" was pleased with the work of the Presentation Division. We called on this Division whenever it was required to illustrate some complex problem of organization. In all of this work Marzani was the "spark-plug." We were grateful to Gen. Nelson for "discovering" him.

But in April of 1946 the long arm of security began to cast its shadow over Marzani. Early that month Bob Bannerman presented me with a batch of files variously stamped "confidential," "secret" and "top secret." These, he explained, were the first concrete results of the Security Office's checks on some of the personnel taken over from the war agencies under the merger. I thumbed through the "top secret" folders; came to one captioned "Carl Aldo Marzani." Automatically, I turned to the covering report and its concluding paragraph, which read: "The Security Committee considers Marzani a grave security risk and recommends termination of his services in the Department."

I could scarcely believe my eyes. This was incredible. I turned to Bannerman and said: "Bob, are you crazy? Marzani has handled some of the hottest stuff in the OSS and in the War Department. Col. Burgess and Gen. Nelson both knew him and they would laugh at anyone who said Marzani was a security risk."

Bannerman's reply was, "That may be, but read the whole report."

I did, with an increasing sense of unreality. Carl Aldo Marzani . . . alias . . . Tony Whales . . . member of the Communist Party . . . in New York in 1941

. . . signed petition for the election of Earl Browder as Congressman on the Communist Party ticket . . . wife a member of the Communist Party, name Edith Charles . . . Activities in the American Negro Congress . . . Campaigned against conscription . . . urged revolution . . .

I had read enough. "How good is the proof on this? Has Tom Fitch got the witnesses?" I asked Bannerman. His reply was that Fitch had not prepared the report, but that its substance was all derived from confidential files of various governmental investigative agencies and considered by him to be reliable. I asked him for his recommendation. It was his opinion that we should terminate Marzani's connection with the Department. I pointed out to him that, under civil service regulations to terminate, i.e., to "fire" Marzani we would have to prefer charges. And in this case the charge would have to be that, since Marzani was a member of the Communist Party, there was a presumption against his loyalty to the Government of the United States which would require his separation from its service.

It is one thing, I explained, to prefer charges of disloyalty against a Federal employee with civil service standing, an entirely different matter to prove them before the Commission's loyalty board. Particularly in a case like Marzani's, where his record of war service had been glowingly praised by high officers of the super-secret OSS and the War Department. Then, too, Marzani being a veteran of World War II had, under the Veterans Preference Act, certain rights of appeal to the Civil Service Commission from any adverse determination of the Department with respect to his employment. This was a case where one had to be *sure*.

While the report was devastating, I was troubled by the fact that it seemed to be based largely on hearsay. I questioned Bannerman more closely. Who had prepared the report? He said Morse Allen, his assistant. I pointed out that Allen certainly could not testify to the charges of his personal knowledge—which Bannerman admitted. I then asked Bannerman whether he himself had gone below the surface of any of the confidential reports from the investigative agencies—had talked to any "flesh and blood" witness with respect to the charges. He admitted that he had not; but reiterated that the reports emanated from so-called confidential informants whose identity the investigative agencies supplying the information would under no circumstances disclose.

Patiently, I pointed out to Bannerman that in this case the Department was in an unenviable dilemma. Here we had in our hands derogatory information with respect to the loyalty of a State Department employee, one who had access to key information—yet we were not in a position to prefer and sustain charges of disloyalty against him. Somewhat less patiently I explained to Bannerman that our investigative staff, which was costing the taxpayers over \$400,000 a year, ought to be able to prove or disprove charges as serious as these by digging up the witnesses; that we should not be forced to rely exclusively on reports of other agencies—who would not disclose the sources of their information.

Bannerman, after some further discussion, agreed this was so. He suggested, however, that possibly Marzani might resign of his own accord if a proper approach was made. This seemed like an excellent idea. Accordingly I told Bannerman to set up a meeting for us with Col. Fearing (Marzani's

immediate superior) to discuss the matter. This was held some time late in April and was attended by Fearing, Bannerman and myself. We all agreed that if Marzani were "fired" he would fight, and that on the present record we would not be able to sustain the charges. After weighing all the factors it was agreed that Fearing should ask Marzani to resign. Against the possibility of his not resigning when requested, I told Bannerman to coordinate with Fitch and leave no stone unturned in their joint efforts to locate any reputable witnesses who could and would personally testify in support of the charges against Marzani.

A FEW WEEKS later the phone in my office rang. It was Col. Fearing, reporting that Marzani had refused to resign. I asked the Colonel for details on what had happened. Fearing replied, "Nothing much. Our talk was short and to the point. He said to me, 'Why should I resign, what's the reason?' I said, 'Security considerations.' He said, 'That's the bunk—I'll take it up with Russell.'"

"So you have him in your lap now!" laughed Fearing and hung up.

And Marzani was indeed in my lap if he appealed to Don Russell (Assistant Secretary of State for Administration). The matter in that eventuality would be turned over to me for my recommendations with respect to the action to be taken by the Secretary of State, since I was in charge of overall security administration under Mr. Russell.

Perspiration rolled down the inside of my starched collar as I laid down the receiver. Could I talk Marzani into resigning? Suppose I could not? In the state of the available evidence we would be "in a box." For if Marzani

was in fact a subversive, he would be alerted, and further development of evidence with respect to his activities would be difficult if not impossible. He could and would immediately and effectively "cover up." Since there was no tangible evidence of his Communist affiliations and activities it would be difficult to make a case against Marzani which would stand up even in the Department, to say nothing of an appeal to the Civil Service Commission or the courts. Hearsay was not enough. Secretary Byrnes, as a former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, would hardly be one to authorize dismissal of an employee on the serious charge of disloyalty unless such a charge was supported by clear and substantial evidence. We were a long way from evidence of that kind.

To make the situation more complicated, there seemed to be no other ground on which we could get rid of Marzani. He certainly was not incompetent or insubordinate, addicted to intoxicants or notoriously immoral.

I did not have very long to wait. During the last week in May Marzani called my office for an appointment to discuss his "personal status" in the Department.

Marzani came in a little before 10 o'clock on June 1. In the informal way of the State Department we were on a first name basis. I called him "Carl" and he called me "Joe." We sat down in the two deep chairs by the fireplace. I lit a cigar; he, a cigarette. Watching him, I wondered what his "fade in" would be. He was neatly dressed in a tan gabardine suit with a light green shirt and a tie of darker green. He seemed entirely at his ease. Except for a pink flush on his cheek bones—which might have been attributable to the heat of a Washington June—and a glitter in

his eyes, he showed no evidence of tension or emotion. After a few preliminary amenities he came right to the point. He said:

"Joe, Fearing asked for my resignation on security grounds. Did you know about it?"

I said, "Yes, Carl, I did."

"Did you authorize him to do it?"

I told him I had. There was a silence. I wondered what was coming next. I had not long to wait. "What are the charges?" His voice, usually husky and not unpleasant, now had a metallic ring, and his brown eyes seemed to have turned a bleak gray. "I'm entitled to know what the charges against me are."

"You certainly are, Carl," I conceded, "and they're serious." I then listed them, watching him carefully for his reaction. As I reached the end of my recital I thought I detected a look of relief pass over his face. When I had concluded, he said "Is that all?" His comeback to my amazed "Good Lord, isn't that enough!" furnished another surprise. He was almost casual. "Joe, all of that is old stuff; there's nothing to any of it." Before I could even reply that such grave charges could not be laughed off with a bare denial, he let me have it.

"How often do I have to prove that these charges are the bunk?" he shouted. "It's the same old stuff that they pulled on me in OSS back in 1943 and it was exploded then as completely phoney!" He shook his finger at me and asked, "How do you think I could have been rated eligible for a job in OSS, if any of this stuff was true?"

He had me there. But here was a chance to get educated. So I asked him "Well, Carl, how *did* you get rated eligible for OSS with these charges on the books?"

He paused to light a cigarette; inhaled deeply and settled back in his chair. He said:

"I'll tell you. Back in 1943 I was in the OSS—just getting started, when the Civil Service Commission rated me ineligible. I went to my bosses, Ed Mason and Emil Despres, and told them what had happened. They went to Gen. Donovan and told him the story; he said he would call up the Commission. I nosed around on my own and found out what some of the charges against me were. When I knew what the score was, I decided to fight it out. I demanded a hearing before the Civil Service Commission's Loyalty Board."

If what Marzani said was true, this was a bold maneuver. He went on:

"I had a formal hearing before the Commission's Loyalty Board on the charges which had been made against me." Pointing his finger at me—speaking slowly—he said, "*Joe, these were the very same charges which you've listed this morning.*"

He paused to let this sink in and continued.

"Well, at the hearing before the Loyalty Board I introduced a complete history of my life in documented form. I myself testified under oath. I called witnesses, people who knew me all my life, people under whom I worked in and out of Government, and *they* all testified under oath. There is a complete transcript of the record of the hearing in the confidential files of the Civil Service Commission. On that record, which incidentally you should look over in case you're interested, I was entirely cleared of disloyalty charges by the Civil Service Commission and rated eligible for service with OSS."

I was flabbergasted. For if what Marzani said was true I could imagine the cries of "double jeopardy" that would

have been raised, to the embarrassment of the Secretary of State and the Department, if we had attempted to "fire" Marzani in 1946 on the very same *disloyalty charges which the Civil Service Commission had dismissed in 1943*.

I pulled myself together and said, "Well, Carl, if what you say is true it certainly puts a different light on the matter. I'll have to read the Civil Service Commission's records and we will talk again." With this the conference got off to a discussion of Marzani's experiences in OSS, his prior history, education and travels.

That two-hour conference was one I knew would be vivid in my memory for a long time to come.

EARLY ON Monday of the next week I got busy. I wanted to know and know fast whether our security people had seen the Civil Service Commission's record of the Marzani hearing, and if so, why no mention had been made of it in the security report on Marzani which had been submitted to me by Bannerman. My cross-examination of Bannerman and his aides disclosed that they had not seen the record. Enraged and disgusted, I immediately requisitioned it and read it with the greatest care. There was no question about it—the hearing by the Civil Service Commission's Loyalty Board in 1943 *did involve the very same charges which our security people had made against Marzani*. After the hearing, the Commission *had* rated Marzani eligible for employment in the OSS. Marzani's amazing story was true.

Despite this, there was something in the whole set-up that did not ring true. The basic testimony in the hearing was Marzani's own, plus "character" witnesses testifying in his behalf. Strangely enough, the Commission had introduced

no evidence to support the charges against Marzani.

However, the failure of the Security Office in the Marzani case had shaken my confidence in the operation of the Department's personnel investigation set-up. I immediately launched a thorough-going examination which disclosed an extremely disturbing situation. While the Chief Special Agent, Tom Fitch, was charged with the duty of investigating State Department employees for security and fitness—a function for which Congress had appropriated funds at a rate of \$400,000 a year—Fitch's operation was being thwarted by the activities of the newly established "Security Office." The end product was intrigue—working at cross-purposes—with resulting chaos and irresponsibility.

The investigation also showed that the Security Office had arranged things in such fashion that the Department's Chief Special Agent was excluded from liaison with the FBI: that the Security Committee (a supposedly impartial body whose sole function was to *evaluate* evidence produced by the Department's investigators and security officers in respect of personnel) was operating under the chairmanship of Bob Bannerman and was composed for the most part of members of his own staff. We thus had a situation where investigators sat in judgment on the quality of evidence which they had gathered—acting not only as investigators but as prosecutors, court and jury—a "kangaroo court." Finally, I found that the "Security Committee" *had excluded from its membership* the State Department's outstanding expert on Communist doctrine and subversive techniques of infiltration!

Upon Secretary Byrnes' return from the Paris Conference in July of 1946 and with his approval we overhauled

our entire personnel security operation. The job of investigations of personnel was firmly placed under Tom Fitch, the Chief Special Agent. Bannerman was requested to confine himself to the coordination of Fitch's reports, with such information as might be available at FBI, ONI, G2, etc. To bolster up the Department's sagging communications and physical security operation I personally appealed to Gen. Carter Clarke, then Deputy Chief of Staff, G2, to give us his best security officer. He recommended Col. Stanley Goodrich who was immediately employed and placed in charge of our physical and communications security system—working directly out of my office. The "kangaroo court" Security Committee was scrapped, to be replaced by a *group of high officials of the Department whose sole duty was to evaluate the evidence developed by the investigators*, and make recommendations to the Assistant Secretary for Administration. This time the group *included* the Department's top expert on Communists and Communist techniques. Mr. Samuel Klaus, a lawyer experienced in the detection and control of subversive activities as a member of the staff of the General Counsel of the Treasury Department, was designated counsel to the new security group. *To shield this group from improper pressures in security matters its identity was kept secret. Its membership was designated by secret written order of the Secretary of State. Its counsel was appointed by similar order.*

By the end of July, 1946, I was confident that the blueprints of the new security set-up in the Department of State were as good as experience and skill could contrive. But we had to get the organization out of the blueprint stage and into operations.

Throughout the first six months of

the year members of Congress had been demanding a purge of alleged subversives in the Department. Indeed, late in June of 1946 the Appropriations Committee of the Senate tacked the so-called McCarran rider to the Department's appropriation bill for the fiscal year 1947. This rider, which had been prepared by me at the request of Senators McCarran and Bridges, gave the Secretary of State the power to dismiss any employee of the Department without regard to Civil Service rules or regulations if, in the Secretary's discretion, such action was warranted in the interests of the government. Both Senator McCarran, Chairman of the Committee, and Senator Bridges, the then ranking Republican member (now chairman) told me in no uncertain terms that they expected the Department to use the power thus granted. Since Secretary Byrnes' policy was that even under the rider he would not dismiss an employee for reasons of disloyalty unless there was some substantial evidence of such disloyalty, it was up to the new security organization to do a job of getting the evidence.

As Security Counsel, Klaus and Chief Special Agent Fitch started the tremendous job of reinvestigating several hundred selected security cases. I did not hear much about Marzani—although his case was high on the priority list—until September of 1946. Early that month Klaus came to me and requested permission for Agent Fitch to send a strong task force to undertake a thorough combing of the secret records of the New York City Police Department. I gave the mission my hearty approval and asked to be kept fully and currently informed of progress.

Our first real "pay dirt" in this effort came late in October. Sam Klaus

reported to me that our investigators had found some interesting data on "Tony Whales" in the secret records of the New York Police Department's Anti-Subversive Squad, a unit organized by Mayor LaGuardia for the sole purpose of infiltrating Communist activities in New York during the war. A few days later Klaus reported that these records appeared to bear out the charges involving Marzani's Communist activities.

We were on a warm trail at long last! Our men went into high gear. Klaus and Fitch had their staff analyze and follow through on the reports. Their author, a college-bred Negro detective, Archer Drew—later to become the star witness against Marzani—confirmed the story of the records in minute detail. Finally, under close questioning, he described Tony Whales. The description checked remarkably with that of Carl Marzani. I directed that we obtain immediate and unequivocal identification of Marzani as Whales.

Klaus obtained three separate photographs of Marzani and inserted each in a panel of other pictures of people with somewhat similar cast of features. These were taken from Washington to New York and Archer Drew was asked whether Tony Whales appeared in any of the panels. *Each time he unerringly and instantly identified Marzani as Tony Whales!*

At this point, and for the first time in the case, the efforts of Klaus and Fitch had produced a "flesh and blood" witness who could and would testify as to Marzani's Communist affiliations and activities. For the first time we had positive proof that Marzani had lied about his Communist affiliations to the FBI in 1942, to the Civil Service Commission in 1943, and to the Department of State in 1946. In the case of the FBI and the Civil Service Commission,

where his statements had been given under oath, he had committed perjury. Unfortunately a criminal proceeding was barred by the Federal Statute of Limitations, which requires action to be started within two years of the commission of the crime.

The best remaining basis for criminal action against Marzani appeared to be his willful concealment of his Communist membership, affiliations and activities in connection with his employment in the State Department. However, the Federal statute on this type of fraud had never been tested in court in a loyalty case and there was some doubt among the Department's lawyers as to whether criminal prosecution would be successful. Klaus and I concluded, however, that this was a case in which the statute clearly applied.

We also felt that if prosecution in the Marzani case was successful, it would immeasurably help in the solution of the problem of subversives in the Federal Government. It has been my experience that subversives find it not too difficult to remain in the service of the government through the simple expedient of concealing their real affiliations and sympathies. They correctly discount the chance of detection as improbable—involving usually an "induced" resignation. Even in the event of dismissal it was not too difficult to find another "billet." *But* if such misrepresentation or concealment involved a real danger of criminal prosecution and a definite possibility of a term in the Federal Penitentiary, Klaus and I felt that there would be an exodus of Commies, fellow-travelers and other subversives from the Federal Service.

THE FIRST STEP was to obtain the Secretary's authority for Marzani's dismissal and his approval of our refer-

ence of the matter to the Department of Justice. This had to await the Secretary's return to the Department after the completion of the work of the Council of Foreign Ministers. In the meantime, we were feverishly developing evidence of Marzani's communistic activities in New York.

Despite our utmost efforts to prevent Marzani from becoming aware of these activities, he managed to get word, through his Communist contacts in New York, that something was "cooking." He called on me on November 15 to tell me that he was "tired" of being persecuted and that he had decided to resign from the department and enter private business. It was apparent to me that Marzani knew he would be fired and that he probably would be prosecuted for his fraud in concealing his Communist connections. It was smart strategy for him to "resign" before dismissal and indictment.

I listened noncommittally. It was too late for Marzani to resign. His case was even then—out of my hands—on its way to the Security Committee and then to Mr. Russell and finally to Mr. Byrnes for action. When he left I immediately issued orders that his resignation was not to be accepted. So far as the Department of State was concerned, Marzani could not be permitted to resign. The Department was in possession of evidence indicating that he had committed a crime. Accordingly, it was obvious that he had to be dismissed under the McCarran rider *in the best interests of the government*. After that, his case had to be referred to the Department of Justice.

On December 20, shortly after the Secretary's return from New York, I was authorized to sign Marzani's notice of dismissal under the McCarran rider. This was sent to him by registered mail

the same day. Shortly thereafter Sam Klaus was authorized by Mr. Russell to present the matter to Attorney-General Tom Clark. Immediately after his conference with Klaus the Attorney-General ordered presentation of the matter to the next Grand Jury and the case was assigned for preparation to John R. Kelley, Jr., Special Assistant to the Attorney-General.

AT THE OUTSET Kelley was somewhat dubious of the chances of obtaining an indictment, much less a conviction, in the case. As he saw it, the law of the case depended on the untested fraud statute. Furthermore, there were really only two key witnesses to sustain the case—Archer Drew, the New York City Police detective, and myself. In a critical case of "first impression" such as this, involving all sorts of political dynamite, any prosecutor likes to have an abundance of evidence and plenty of good witnesses. Kelley was no exception. It was Sam Klaus, working in close cooperation with Kelley, who slowly but surely overcame the latter's doubts. Klaus brought Drew down from New York and after one conference with the detective, Kelley knew he had a potential star witness. He decided to proceed full steam ahead.

The Grand Jury was impaneled and after hearing Detective Drew, myself and others, promptly handed down an indictment on eleven counts against Marzani. As the slow but inexorable process of Federal justice began to catch up with Marzani, the Communist Party high command began to take an interest in the case. They knew that a conviction in this case would mark the beginning of the end of their subversive operations in the government.

During the period that the case was

awaiting trial, Marzani was kept under strict surveillance. He was in constant communication with key Communists throughout the country. While he was represented by Washington counsel, we knew that the real strategy of his defense was being developed by the party's brain trust in New York. Finally, early in May the case was reached for trial and "all the chips were down." Failure to obtain a conviction was certain to send the President's \$25,000,000 Employee Loyalty Program floundering on the rocks of administrative uncertainty.

The opening court skirmish turned on the selection of a jury. The counsel for the defense repeatedly excused the "solid citizen" type of prospective juror. The jury, as finally impaneled, included nine Negroes. We knew that Marzani intended to stress his activities in the American Negro Congress as benevolent rather than subversive. While the prosecution felt that Marzani did not have a chance of acquittal on the evidence that would be produced against him at the trial, there was always a possibility of a "hung" jury. For it takes just one juror to bring about a disagreement and a new trial.

Marzani and his counsel were obviously elated. They evidently felt that the possibility of a disagreement was excellent. They literally exuded confidence as the trial began. From my own experience in the trial of many cases in the courts of New York, I shared somewhat the prosecution's fears with respect to the outcome.

The trial opened sleepily. The Government prosecutor, Mr. Kelley, was the soul of caution. He leaned backward in his efforts to introduce nothing in evidence that would give rise to the slightest possibility of error. It was sound strategy to undertry the case. If

the government attempted to bear down, Marzani would undoubtedly raise the cry of "Persecution."

On about the fourth day of the trial I was called as the Government's first chief witness. The substance of my direct testimony was brief. First, my official position in the Department of State, its scope, my responsibilities in the field of security, my relationships with Marzani, the time that I first learned of any derogatory information about him involving his loyalty. Then Prosecutor Kelley came to the heart of the case—my conversation with Marzani on June 1, 1946. The climax came when I told the story of the Department's development of the real evidence of Marzani's Communist relationships and activities, in October-November of 1946, and his prompt dismissal under the McCarran rider in December.

As the defense attorney rose to cross-examine, I wondered, sitting in the witness chair, what his tactics would be. For obviously it was vitally necessary for the defense to overcome the effect of my testimony. After a few ineffective efforts to shake my recollection (a preliminary cross-examination routine) the defense attorney got down to business. First he repeatedly brought out that there had been no one present at the June 1 conference except Marzani and myself. *Then he produced a paper prepared by Marzani which purported to set forth what was said by him and by me at the conference of June 1—all in direct quotes.*

As the defense counsel read to me, statement by statement, what I allegedly had said and what Marzani claimed *he* had said, I began to grasp the pattern of the defense strategy.

If the jury believed Marzani's version of the crucial conversation of June 1, it followed that he and I *had never dis-*

cussed the question of his loyalty or his Communist activities and affiliations. We had discussed, according to him, the folly of the Department's "anti-Soviet" policy and agreed that it was bad. We—according to Marzani—deplored J. Edgar Hoover's "witch-hunting" and that of certain members of Congress. We allegedly had agreed that the real security risks in the Department were the so-called "liberals," who "blabbed out State Department secrets at cocktail parties and to newspaper columnists." The first thing to be noticed about this anticipatory cross-examination was that it followed the Communist party-line—to attack a firm foreign policy as anti-Soviet; to smear J. Edgar Hoover and members of Congress as witch-hunters; to divert suspicion to liberals as the real subversives. Marzani was putting on a show for the comrades.

But he was also laying the foundation of his defense, in which he hoped the sole issue would be his word against mine. If the jury believed his story that we did *not* discuss his Communist Party affiliations and operations on June 1, then Marzani did *not* lie about them to me in my capacity as an official of the Department of State, and an acquittal was likely to result. If he as much as convinced *one* juror, there would be a disagreement and a new trial. This could go on *ad infinitum* until the Department of Justice eventually *nolle-prosse*-d the case out of sheer weariness and frustration.

MY HUNCH on the strategy of the defense proved quite accurate. As the case progressed, Marzani's plan to confuse the issues in the mind of the jury became more and more apparent, always coupled with the tacit insinuation that he was being framed by the Government to provide a Roman holi-

day for the witch-hunters in the Republican Congress. The "pitch" was having real effect on the jury and even on the press correspondents.

Fortunately Prosecutor Kelley had some aces of his own to play. Marzani, of course, knew that the key witness to his communistic activities was detective Archer Drew. But what he did not know was that through the unremitting efforts of Sam Klaus and Tom Fitch the prosecution had on tap two former members of the Communist Party who—prior to their expulsion—had known Marzani as a Communist and who were prepared to identify him as Tony Whales. Kelley decided to put these two witnesses on the stand before he climaxed his case with Archer Drew.

This brilliant handling of the case paid dividends. Marzani was shaken to be identified in open court as Tony Whales by two former members of the Communist Party. And he could attack this testimony only by arguing that a Communist can never be believed even under oath—a line with extremely dangerous implications to his own case. By this time the case had reached its high point of suspense. The jury was alert. The newspapermen who, up to this time, had been taking a restrained view of the testimony, were now taking copious notes. Prosecutor Kelley, now fully warmed up to his work, unfolded his climax carefully.

First he introduced the testimony of Lt. Gallagher, a distinguished-looking veteran of the New York Police force. Gallagher testified how in 1940, under orders from Mayor LaGuardia, he had set up an "undercover" operation for the sole purpose of penetrating the Communist organization in New York City. A most important part of the mission of this group, he explained, was the detection of subversive opera-

tions among the Negro groups in New York. For this assignment a Negro detective was required. After careful study of all available candidates, Gallagher testified, Archer Drew was selected for this delicate and vital job.

With this introduction, Archer Drew took the stand. He identified his official reports on Marzani's activities which, four years ago, he had filed in Police Headquarters. Under careful questioning he then launched into a description of his undercover operations. He told the story of how he joined the party and was given the party name of "Bill Easley"; how "Tony Whales" and he became friends; how he visited Tony and his wife "Edith Charles" at their apartment. He recounted how Tony told him of his boyhood struggles, of his fight to get an education, of his entry into Williams College, of his studies in England and his trip around the world. Drew painted a vivid picture of the close relationship existing between himself and Tony Whales; of their frequent discussion of the objectives of the Communist Party and the best methods of their achievement.

At the conclusion of this testimony, Prosecutor Kelley asked Drew to say whether Tony Whales was in the courtroom. Unhesitatingly Drew pointed to Marzani and cried: "That's Tony—that's Tony Whales."

The effect of Drew's identification of Marzani as Tony Whales was electrifying to the jury. Even the most laconic of the press correspondents were writing feverishly; some were rushing out of the courtroom to flash the news to catch the late edition of the Washington afternoon papers. Marzani, his sallow face an ashen gray, was whispering excitedly to his lawyer who was shaking his head doubtfully.

After the defense's cross-examination

of Archer Drew—which merely tightened the noose about Marzani—the Government rested its case.

The trial dragged on for several more days, through a procession of character witnesses, climaxed by Marzani's hysterical testimony in his own behalf, which was riddled by Prosecutor Kelley's cross-examination. But for all practical purposes, Marzani's fate was settled when Drew pointed him out.

After both sides rested and the lawyers summed up, Judge Keech instructed the jury in a charge which was a model of fairness. The jury retired; elected a foreman; returned with a conviction of Marzani on all eleven counts. "School was out" for Carl Aldo Marzani.

WITH Marzani's conviction a *fait accompli*, I was off on a long-delayed mission to Germany. On the airliner I opened the current issue of *Newsweek* and was somewhat surprised to see a picture of Marzani leading off the feature article. I had been close to the Marzani case for so long that I had become numb to its significance as a matter of public interest. To me, aside from its element of counter-espionage, the case represented a difficult technical problem in the arduous but unspectacular business of developing a basic criminal sanction on which the government could build an effective counter-infiltration program.

As I read the arresting caption under Marzani's picture, "His conviction gave the government hope," I could not help wondering whether the average reader would realize the tremendous amount of planning, professional skill and sheer tenacity on the part of all concerned which had been required to convict Marzani the hard way—in open court and before a jury virtually of his own choosing.

Letter to A Communist

Dear Bill:

Although our views are diametrically opposed, I do respect you as a human being, whose intentions are essentially good. You are admittedly an ardent Communist. You firmly believe in the necessity of destroying root and branch our system of government and our way of life, and of substituting for it the system prevailing in Russia. Like many of your fellow zealots, you are doing everything in your power to accomplish that end.

In your daily life you are a careful person. I remember how meticulously you examined that last gabardine suit you bought, when you sought my services as an expert. I have often told you how much I admire your household, in which every gadget was chosen with considered judgment. You shopped around for your car, studying various makes and perusing countless catalogues. When you bought your home you delved into real estate values, zoning laws, construction costs, transportation facilities before you made your decision.

Now you would impose irretrievably upon your children, your friends and the American people as a whole, a Communist government. I say irretrievably because once a dictatorship has entrenched itself in power, you cannot change your mind and vote it out of office. For better or for worse, you will have made your choice for your wife and children and your countrymen—for the rest of their lives.

In view of the gravity of the choice I think all of us have a right to ask just how much you know about this system you espouse. You have never visited Russia or the countries under its domination. You have never experienced

what life is like under the Communist dictatorship. You accept at face value all the glowing sales talk of the left-wing writers about the Soviet paradise, although you have always laughed at similar hokum by other press-agents who were trying to sell you something—a washing machine, for example. You steadfastly refuse to read the accounts of unbiased observers who have lived in Russia for years, who know its language and its people. You brush these writers aside as “prejudiced,” because they do not bolster your preconceived illusions.

If you could live for only a few weeks under the surveillance of an omnipotent secret police, you would find existence stifling. You would realize that, under a Communist system, you had lost certain rights which you had long taken for granted, like the air you breathe. Here are some of them: the right to freedom of speech, press, assembly and worship; the right to trial by jury, habeas corpus, the acknowledgment of innocence until proved guilty; the right to join a free and independent trade union; the right to take a job or enter a business and to leave it as you please; the right to vote for a candidate of his opponent; the right to help correct evils where they exist; the right to leave your country if you wish, and to travel around within your country wherever you please, without submitting to an internal passport system.

These freedoms can be easily lost and never regained. So when you choose a social system for your loved ones, please exercise at least as much care, judgment and study as you do when you buy a car, a suit of clothes or a household gadget.

Lyle Yost

A Note of Mystery

Freda Utley's article, "Red Star Over Independence Square," published in our last issue, has evoked wide interest. In addition to the communication of Mr. Lyons, which adds a vital piece omitted from the original puzzle as reconstructed by Miss Utley, we are in receipt of copies of correspondence between readers of The Saturday Evening Post and its editors dealing with Edgar Snow's crypto-Communist writings.

To the Editor of PLAIN TALK:

In her devastating exposé of Edgar Snow, Freda Utley rightly refers to that gentleman's participation in the ugly ganging-up on W. L. White. May I, as a footnote, direct your attention to a splendid editorial which appeared about that time on the subject of the "going-over" Bill White got from the phoney intellectuals and Stalinoid critics?

The editorial was captioned "Why Young Bill White Became Expendable." It pointed out that White "felt compelled to say what he thought about the system under which they (the Russians) live," and that "this, of course, horrified the reviewers, most of whom seem to accept the view that any notice taken of Russia save in laudatory hyperbole is necessarily wicked."

Instead of dealing objectively with facts, the critics resorted to slander, the editorial showed. It seems perfectly respectable to criticize China, or Britain, or any other Ally—but not Soviet Russia. "Too many of the people who tell the public what kind of books it ought to read," the editorial declared, "are a little touchy about having the nature of

the Communist setup understood by the rank and file of Americans."

Though the editorial did not specifically mention the journalists' round-robin against Bill White, its comments apply to that episode as well. The hostile reviewers were at least in their natural role of critics. The gang-up boys did not even have that saving surface excuse. They were self-appointed censors doing mayhem on a colleague—many of them, as later appeared, without even having read his book.

Where did the editorial appear? I have postponed that item of information as a kicker to this footnote. It appeared in *The Saturday Evening Post*!

In effect, the *Post* thus had a scathing indictment of one of its own editors in its own pages. Not only, however, did party-liner Snow continue on the editorial staff of the *Post*, but he has continued to do the kind of thing the editorial condemned—whitewashing one Ally while smearing other Allies, the United States included. The "strange case of Edgar Snow and *The Saturday Evening Post*" seems even stranger, more mysterious, more inexplicable in the light of these facts.

EUGENE LYONS

ANSWERS TO LIBERTYGRAM

1. Lazarus, Emma—"The New Colossus: Inscription for the Statue of Liberty, New York Harbor"
2. Diogenes Laertius—"Repiander 4"
3. Ibsen, Henrik—"The Pillars of Society"
4. Jefferson, Thomas
5. Curran, John Philpot—"Speech upon the Right of Election"
6. Webster, Daniel—"Speech in the House of Representatives, 1824, on the Revolution in Greece"
7. Quincy, Josiah—"Observation on the Boston Port," 1774

A BOOKMAN'S HORIZON

What Price Freedom?

By BURTON RASCOE

HERE ARE six new books concerned, in varying degrees of emphasis, with the concept of liberty under different aspects of political reality. There is no subject more important to us, now or ever; for "liberty" or "freedom" is a catchword as well as an ideal. Like "democracy," it is exploited to its fullest emotional potency by scoundrels; but it is a word that had a sacred and definite meaning to, let us say, Thomas Jefferson. Stalin slays his millions and Tito his tens of thousands in the name of "democracy," and to the Puritan oligarchs of New England freedom meant freedom to employ stark and terrible punitive measures against those whose notion of "sin" did not coincide with their own.

Perhaps of greatest immediate importance is Edward J. Flynn's book, *You're The Boss*. It is much more than an autobiography of a machine boss of the Democratic National Party; it is a handbook for voters. It is a quiet, candid lecture on the facts of life in the functioning of our government under the two-party system. It may shock idealists but nobody has a right to kick against the kind of government he gets who does not understand how municipal, county, state and federal officers are chosen as candidates and elected. Mr. Flynn, who has been the boss of the Democratic machine in the Bronx for 25 years and has never lost an election in his borough, tells just how a political machine works. Not only his machine but all machines, Republican, Democra-

tic or independent. A machine may be "clean" or corrupt, malign or beneficent, inefficient or efficient; but the purpose of a machine is to win elections, hold political power, distribute patronage. The casual voter may go to the polls occasionally, ignorant of issues and determined only to register a conviction or a protest; but when he goes he has been "sold" on a question or on a candidate by loyal machine workers of one party or the other, who are on the job 24 hours a day, every day in the year.

Mr. Flynn says frankly that you may have all the best qualities of Jefferson, Washington and Lincoln for political office but, if you haven't got a powerful machine behind you, you haven't even a sucker's chance at the polls. Candidates are sometimes chosen by the machine bosses for curious reasons. Truman was chosen to be Franklin D. Roosevelt's running mate at the last election, says Mr. Flynn, because he was considered, among several possibilities, to be the candidate calculated to do Roosevelt "the least harm" in the election returns.

Mr. Flynn explains and defends the political principle of the "balanced ticket," wherein a candidate is chosen because of his race or religion, rather than for weightier considerations, because racial and religious groups are a voting fact which an astute politician would be foolish to ignore. The machine's choice of a candidate because of his race or religion to "balance the ticket" does not always work out suc-

cessfully, according to Mr. Flynn, because any racial or religious bloc cannot always be depended upon to vote the way the boss expects it to; and he gives some examples of this unusual phenomenon.

A successful machine boss, Mr. Flynn says frankly, is one who "takes care of his boys," that is, his loyal precinct workers. He gets them exempt jobs; he loans them money when they are in need; he takes care of their families when they are in trouble. Moreover, he is true to his pledged word. Mr. Flynn's chief criticism of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who, he says, had the greatest political sense of anyone he has ever known, with the possible exception of Fiorello LaGuardia (whom Mr. Flynn doesn't like) is that Roosevelt was evasive if not downright untruthful and that he was not to be depended upon to keep his word.

The machine boss has his woes and tribulations. He can get all set to push through the election of a candidate chosen by other leaders of his party only to have nearly all the leaders, from the President on down, run out on him at the last moment. It happened in the case of Joseph V. McKee, for whom Flynn was asked to form a new political set-up called the Recovery Party, a sort of subsidiary of the Democratic Party, in the New York mayoralty campaign of 1933. McKee's backers included F.D.R., Herbert

Bayard Swope, Roy Howard, Averill Harriman, Raymond Moley, Samuel Untermyer and all the anti-Tammany Democratic bosses. But LaGuardia, whose political stock-in-trade, says Flynn, is "abuse and name-calling," got hold of an article McKee had written when he was a teacher in DeWitt Clinton High School, distorted the text and accused McKee of being anti-Semitic. In vain did Nathan Straus, Jr., and other prominent Jews refute the attack; the others took a run-out powder at this injection of a false accusation of prejudice into the campaign; Roosevelt clammed up, and McKee's political goose was cooked.

You can condemn Tammany Hall, the Kelly machine in Chicago, the Pendergast machine in Kansas City, the Curley machine in Boston, the Crump machine in Memphis or the Penrose machine in Pennsylvania. You can bleat and yell and deplore, says Flynn, but it will do you no good unless you can set up another machine strong enough to overthrow it. And you will have to distri-

bute patronage and be good to your "boys" or you won't have any machine and you won't win any elections.

Flynn is not cynical; he is merely truthful, with a cold, ghastly, incisive earnestness. He is a Fordham graduate, a cultivated man, who writes with ease, force and clarity; he confesses he was a "playboy" and something of a rounder in his

DISCUSSED THIS MONTH

YOU'RE THE BOSS. By Edward J. Flynn. Viking Press. \$3

TOM'S TOWN. By William M. Reddig. J. B. Lippincott. \$4

TITO'S IMPERIAL COMMUNISM. By R. H. Markham. University of North Carolina Press. \$4

THE PURITAN OLIGARCHY. Volume II of THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, of which THE MIDDLE COLONIES was the first. By Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker. Charles Scribner's Sons. \$5

JEFFERSON—WAR AND PEACE: 1776 to 1784. Second volume of a new study of Jefferson, of which THE ROAD TO GLORY was the first. By Marie Kimball. Coward-McCann. \$6

PATRICK HENRY. By Jacob Axelrad. Random House. \$3.75

youth, hated politics and disliked being forced into it. But once he did get into it, he learned the trade thoroughly. Those who hope to preserve our democratic institutions and preserve our liberties had better use *You're The Boss* as a textbook. Whether you like or dislike Flynn or relish his brand of politics is beside the point; as long-time boss of the Bronx he knows his job and is very honest and explicit about what such a job consists of. And it has a national, as well as local, importance.

Sometimes political machines grow corrupt and evil, as Tammany has grown, from time to time, and as the Pendergast machine grew in Kansas City. The Pendergast corruption was exposed, the boss was sent to prison and the machine was purged. But the legal structure of the machine is the same as it was before, and it functions now just as it always did but with decent citizens in charge of it. William M. Reddig, a newspaper man, has told of the rise and fall of the Pendergast machine in *Tom's Town*. It is an unsavory story, but Reddig has told it without rancor and with a certain relish in the more bizarre aspects of the melodrama.

Flynn reminds us that it is the business of the machine boss to find out what the majority of voters want and give it to them. The majority of voters in Kansas City no longer wanted Pendergastism, so they tossed him and his boodle gang into the dustbin. Our system of free elections and our freedom of speech permits voters to do that.

But God help us if we allow the Communists in our midst to persuade us that totalitarianism is a better form of government. The story that R. H. Markham tells in *Tito's Imperial Communism* is horrifying. Markham was originally a missionary educator in Bulgaria, who took up journalism after

World War I and became correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor* in the Balkans. He knows the peoples of the region and their tragic history and he tells it with heat and vigor, but with such anxiety to be fair and accurate as almost to lean over backwards. He puts the blame for Tito, as he should, squarely on the shoulders of Churchill and Roosevelt. We and the British bought him, groomed him, sponsored him. Now we are stuck with him while Stalin smiles grimly. From Markham's description of the character and proclivities of the Serbs, Slovenes, Croats and Montenegrins there seems to be a hope that Markham doesn't envisage. These peoples, so independent of spirit and yet so long under foreign yokes, may yet combine to challenge the iron hand of Russia, out of sheer bravado of nationalist spirit.

DR. WERTENBAKER, a South Carolinian, is not as much at home in *The Puritan Oligarchy*, his study of the New England contribution to the founding of our civilization, as he was in his study, *The Middle Colonies*. He is unsympathetic to the bleak mores of the Calvinist Dissenters and says flatly that it is "completely erroneous" to believe that the "Puritans came to the New World in the cause of religious freedom." It is not completely erroneous so to believe. The Puritans came here in the cause of religious freedom—their own—and the fact that they became like the thing they hated and sought to establish their own intolerant oligarchy of Church and State does not alter the fact that they successfully revolted against a situation that was intolerable to them, and so, to that extent, contributed their share to the fight against intolerance.

Dr. Wertenbaker has gone back to England in his book for the historical

background of the Puritan pilgrimage and has done a very exhaustive job in accounting for New England spirit in the American revolution and in the development of the nation. He has shown how the abler, more aggressive and more acquisitive Puritans of Massachusetts founded an oligarchy of Church and State that was punitive and repressive toward "sinners" of every degree, as a means of solidifying and perpetuating their power.

"Sin" in Puritan New England consisted as much in doubting the omniscience of Governor Winthrop, or the wisdom and efficacy of the five-year-plans for the Wilderness Zion as it did in smiling on Sunday, taking a nip too much, or being caught with a copy of the Anglican Book of Common Prayer. The oligarchy developed its own NKVD, called the "tithing men," whose job it was to spy on their neighbors and report to a magistrate if anybody was caught kissing his wife on a Sabbath or playing pinochle—indulging in unprofitable use of leisure was a punishable offense, doubly so when complicated by card-playing. The offender was fined ten shillings, half of which went to the snooper and half to pay the upkeep of the bureaucracy.

But there is something perennially characteristic of the human spirit, particularly of those who emigrated to this expanding continent, and that is a slow or quick impatience with restraint. Dr. Wertenbaker doesn't say it in so many words, but he shows how the "sinners" became too numerous to endure the tyranny of the oligarchs—and just took their means of power away from them. Such "sinners" as Sam Adams were foremost in fomenting the American revolution which put an end to the Puritan oligarchy though it did not destroy the virtues of the Puritan contribution

to enlightenment, chief of which was the public school system, which educated generations of New Englanders while the majority of the middle and southern colonists were still illiterate and dominated by a slave-owning aristocracy or a merchant plutocracy.

MRS. KIMBALL is curator of the Thomas Jefferson Memorial Foundation, and the present *Jefferson—War and Peace* is the second volume of her new study of Jefferson. It is an historian's history, crammed with citations verbatim and at length. Therefore it is very heavy going for one who reads for enjoyment. This volume treats of Jefferson's years immediately after his drafting of the Declaration of Independence and covers his most unhappy period, when he was governor of Virginia.

It was while Jefferson was governor that he was most under fire as weak or vacillating; it was then that he found the air full of dead cats. And the reason was that he stood steadfast in his principles as laid down in the Declaration, in the Virginia articles of religious toleration and in the Bill of Rights to the Constitution. An emergency certainly existed which justified his seizing dictatorial powers, levying troops, confiscating property, issuing paper money—doing all the things the dictator-minded man finds easy excuse for doing. But Jefferson refused to overthrow the system of checks and balances which he deemed essential to good government; he wouldn't sacrifice one jot of his principles to expediency; he would act only in accordance with the rules and laws he believed in. And he rode out the storm, the traitorous conspiracy of Benedict Arnold and the threat of Cornwallis' army which came near defeating the revolution.

To Jefferson's everlasting glory, he

remained a believer in liberty, in freedom, in the principles of democratic government.

To get this story more easily and refreshingly, one should read it in Axelrad's biography, *Patrick Henry*, where it is told with fairness, concision and grace. There is not a great deal to be said about Henry as a factor in the creation of the new nation; but Axelrad, who is a biographer of Anatole France, has a gift for clear and simple narration; he has absorbed his material and let it flow out of him in an appealing characterization. He perhaps spends too much space explaining Henry's speculation in western lands. He didn't need to; it was a common practice and as legitimate

as that of a President's investing in the common shares of an American corporation. It denoted faith in the development of the country. Axelrad might have spent more time explaining Henry's rather dictatorial conduct as governor of Virginia.

Henry was the mouthpiece of the revolution; he was an actor, an orator, practically illiterate, but he knew how to dramatize the struggle for liberation against English tyranny and his catch-lines in speeches never written down or fully reported, "If this be treason, make the most of it," and "Give me liberty or give me death!" were as surely heard around the world as were the musket shots at Lexington.

SUMMER CLERGY IN SOVIETDOM

By THE VERY REV. FREDERICK W. BEEKMAN

Dean of the American Cathedral, Paris

DURING THE between-wars period it came to be the summer custom for certain American clergymen to visit Soviet Russia. These visits were usually prearranged and always conducted by an agency of the Soviet Government. Almost always those invited were more than less in sympathy with the aims and ideology of the Soviet State.

Some of them passed through Paris and called on me as they were going and returning. While in Russia, they saw those Russians and those features of Russian life which the Soviets permitted, none other, and they were under the closest supervision. Some resented this. Others did not seem to realize with what meticulous care they were "steered" in the desired direction.

A month or so ago, a group of seven American Protestant clergymen visited Yugoslavia, a satellite state of Russia, upon a Soviet-inspired invitation of Marshal Tito, who is in daily touch with Moscow. Some of this group had a long record of outspoken approval of Soviet aims and methods. Others had not. But just as was the case with similar clergy groups which visited Russia between the two world wars, this group saw and heard what was planned and allowed by their host, Tito, and their report bore a striking similarity to those which in years past had followed clergy visits to Russia.

The report of the seven clergymen seeks to assure the American people that Tito allows religious freedom in Yugo-

slavia, and the evidence adduced for this is that the church doors in Yugoslavia are open and regular church services are held. This was the same line taken by certain visitors to Russia.

But is the fact that church doors are open and religious services held conclusive evidence that there is religious freedom in Yugoslavia under Tito? Certainly not, and none should know this better than this very group of American Protestant clergymen whom Tito invited to Yugoslavia. Granted that prayers are said by priests and people, that the sacraments are administered with benediction and sermons preached, of what do the services actually consist, what is their character and effect?

Years ago, Lenin accused the Orthodox Church of Russia of giving the people "opiates." Directly and by inference, he charged that the Church of which the Czar was the head had emasculated the religion of which Christ was the founder, had subtracted from it its creative power to inspire its followers to see clearly and work constantly for a better world. He charged that in Russia, the Church had been reduced to an organization the sole purpose of which was to lead the faithful in prayers to God for strength to bear the sufferings of this present world. Lenin charged that this high policy of the Orthodox Church of the Czar was part of a plan to maintain Imperial Czardom.

Lenin complained of this and rightly so. But now the dictatorship of the Czars has been replaced by the dictatorship of the Soviet, and in Yugoslavia by the iron-handed dictatorship of Marshal Tito who is Moscow-trained and directed. The point at issue is simply this: Is there or is there not real religious freedom? Are the churches which remain open permitted by the State to give

to their people in prayer and sermon the true content of Christ's growing kingdom of righteousness and truth on earth and how to advance it? Are they permitted to preach and talk, as these seven American clergymen themselves preach and talk in the United States, of that "liberty with which Christ and His Gospel sets men free?" Are they permitted to criticize influences in Yugoslavia which to them seem to retard the advance of a better Yugoslavia and which in other parts of the world is considered a Christian duty? Or is freedom limited to the holding of church services where opiates are still given to a people in slavery, living under a ruthless dictator?

Had Marshal Tito invited the American clergy working in Europe, who should and do know Europe and conditions there better than do others, to visit Yugoslavia, these would not have been satisfied at seeing church doors open, but would have asked the questions suggested above. Then they would have given the Christian world an answer consistent with *all* the facts. And the answer would have been: "Were the seven visiting American Protestant leaders citizens of Marshal Tito's State and were they to attempt in or out of the Church to use the smallest fraction of the freedom which they employ in the United States, they would find themselves behind prison bars."

Whether certain Americans at home yet realize it or not, we Americans on duty in Europe know from unmistakable evidence of long years that where there is totalitarian dictatorship, Nazi or Communist, there is always a crushing regimentation of the people, with denial of the civil and religious liberties known in democratic countries—a denial brutally enforced by the State.



This is the first of a series of condensations of great works from the past dealing with the issue of state socialism vs. democratic individualism. In these monthly digests we shall bring to our readers the forecasts of long-neglected thinkers who foresaw the modern retreat from freedom to slavery.

JOHN STUART MILL

By EDNA LONIGAN

ALMOST one hundred years ago, in February, 1848, Europe suddenly burst into a flame of revolt. Old hatreds of political oppressors were reinforced by a new bitterness, by the angry protest of the industrial workers caught in the hurried growth of the factory system. It was a protest voiced that month by two young rebel intellectuals, Marx and Engels, in the Communist Manifesto, which was destined to put its imprint on the future. The "social question" had arrived on the stage of history, to trouble the Western world through the succeeding century.

In the London of the 1850s, two men of high intelligence and strong social conscience were studying the problem of social reform, and laying down the two main roads over which their followers were to travel for generations.

Karl Marx was spending his days in the Reading Room of the British Museum, searching the records of history for proof that the proud capitalist system would soon fall of its own excesses, and the industrial workers could hasten

that fall by violence, and put in its place a State that would obey their will.

John Stuart Mill was working by day in the offices of the East India Company. He gave his leisure to the study of social philosophy, seeking the way by which men could find a happier life.

In 1859 Mill published *On Liberty*, a brief but powerful work in which he warned that all the forces of the age were drawing the Western nations rapidly toward a new collectivism, in which the State controlled by the people would exercise tyrannical powers. Only the most vigorous efforts in defense of liberty would preserve that unique individual quality which was the source of all progress. To Mill, individualism was the only reliable source of social progress: "The only unfailing and permanent source of self-improvement is liberty."

Just as Marx stated the classical argument for state socialism, so Mill stated the classical case for liberty. Mill's doctrine stands as totally opposed to that of Marx. Where Marx was telling the

disinherited classes how they, too, could win power like the dominant group, Mill was telling them that they did not need power, that no one needed it, that liberty, the antithesis of power, would bring the greatest benefits to all.

MILL was born on May 20, 1806. He grew up in the postwar world that followed the defeat of Napoleon. His father, James Mill, was a noted author and supporter of Jeremy Bentham, who was urging his principle of "the greatest good of the greatest number" as a rational test of public policy. The young Mill, although "not the least of a Socialist," according to his autobiography, confessed that "our ideal of ultimate improvement went far beyond Democracy, and would class us decidedly under the general designation of Socialists."

John Stuart Mill first saw the dangers that might arise from popular government on reading de Tocqueville's study of *Democracy in America*. Because de Tocqueville was sympathetic to democracy there was even more force in his warning of the dangers which beset government by a numerical majority, and the need for new safeguards against the tyranny of the people as well as that of the kings.

Mill saw that the essential principle for a good society was not merely that the people should have power over their government, but that they should not use it to exert power over any one else. Only a society of strong and free individuals was a society worth living for.

The high influence that Mill's *On Liberty* has exercised over the minds of men for generations is due in part to the way in which Mill has used the principle of liberty not as an abstraction but as a finely tempered tool, with

which he cut through the cruel and the stupid and the useless elements in social life, leaving only the clean outlines of a society designed for free and self-respecting men.

To Mill liberty is not merely a means to social happiness, but an absolute good, a moral principle. He defined love of liberty as the soundest guide through the political storms of the coming years. He had a prescience that the greatest need for his book would arise far in the future. The people of his day, he said, understood the importance of liberty, but the tendencies were in the direction of increased power of the State.

He feared that the teachings of his *On Liberty* would have their greatest value a long time after his death. "The fears we expressed," he wrote in his autobiography, "lest the inevitable growth of social equality and of the government of public opinion should impose on mankind an oppressive yoke of uniformity in operation and practice, might easily have appeared chimerical to those who looked more at present facts than at tendencies. . . . Whether this noxious power will be exercised, depends upon whether mankind have by that time become aware that it cannot be exercised without stunting and dwarfing human nature."

The time that John Stuart Mill feared is now. These abstracts from his classical essay have never been more timely. The only license we have taken with Mill's text is to break down long paragraphs into shorter ones.

But this abridgement is in no sense a substitute for Mill's whole essay. We hope that it will cause many to go back to the original and read in their entirety the magnificent words of the foremost liberal thinker of the nineteenth century.

ON LIBERTY

By JOHN STUART MILL

THE SUBJECT of this Essay is not the so-called Liberty of the Will . . . but Civil, or Social Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual.

ated, and hardly
eral terms, but
ences the practi-
age by its latent
soon to make
vital question

en Liberty and
conspicuous fea-
of history with
amiliar, particu-
Rome and Eng-
this contest was
e classes of sub-
ent. By liberty,
against the tyrann-
. . .

ssay is to assert
e. . . That prin-
end for which
individually or
g with the lib-

erty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.

These are good reasons for remon-

strating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil in someone else. The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. . .

There is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself, or, if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary and undeceived consent and participation. When I say only himself, I mean directly, and in the first instance: for whatever affects himself, may affect others through himself. . .

This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of

ON LIBERTY

By JOHN STUART MILL

THE SUBJECT of this Essay is not the so-called Liberty of the Will . . . but Civil, or Social Liberty: the nature and limits of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the individual.

A question seldom stated, and hardly ever discussed in general terms, but which profoundly influences the practical controversies of the age by its latent presence, and is likely soon to make itself recognized as the vital question of the future. . .

The struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most conspicuous feature in the portions of history with which we are earliest familiar, particularly in that of Greece, Rome and England. But in old times this contest was between subjects, or some classes of subjects, and the government. By liberty, was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers. . .

The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple principle. . . That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.

These are good reasons for remon-

strating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil in someone else. The only part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. . .

There is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself, or, if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary and undeceived consent and participation. When I say only himself, I mean directly, and in the first instance: for whatever affects himself, may affect others through himself. . .

This, then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It comprises, first, the inward domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral, or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other people; but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty of

thought itself, and resting in great part on the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it.

Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may follow; without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do does not harm them even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong.

Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived.

No society in which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its form of government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified. The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or mental or spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.

Though this doctrine is anything but new, and, to some persons, may have the air of a truism, there is no doctrine which stands more directly opposed to the general tendency of existing opinion and practice. . .

There is also in the world at large an increasing inclination to stretch unduly the powers of society over the in-

dividual, both by the force of opinion and even by that of legislation. As the tendency of all changes taking place in the world is to strengthen society, and diminish the power of the individual, this encroachment is not one of the evils which tend spontaneously to disappear, but, on the contrary, to grow more and more formidable.

The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow-citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others, is so energetically supported by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings incident to human nature, that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want of power. As the power is not declining, but growing, unless a strong barrier of moral conviction can be raised against the mischief, we must expect, in the present circumstances of the world, to see it increase. . .

Liberty of Opinion

LET US suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at one with the people, and never thinks of exerting any power of coercion unless in agreement with what it conceives to be their voice. But I deny the right of the people to exercise such coercion, either by themselves or by their government. The power itself is illegitimate. The best government has no more title to it than the worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious, when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it. If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.

Were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the owner;

if to be obstructed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury, it would make some difference whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many. But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.

It is necessary to consider separately these two hypotheses, each of which has a distinct branch of the argument corresponding to it. We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still. . .

There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because . . . it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right. . .

The beliefs which we have most warrant for, have no safeguard to rest on, but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them unfounded. If the challenge is not accepted, or is accepted and the attempt fails, we are far enough from certainty still; but we have done the best that the existing state of human reason admits of; we have neglected nothing that could give the truth a

chance of reaching us: if the lists are kept open, we may hope that if there be a better truth, it will be found when the human mind is capable of receiving it; and in the meantime we may rely on having attained such approach to truth as is possible in our own day. This is the amount of certainty attainable by a fallible being, and this the sole way of attaining it. . .

Not that it is solely, or chiefly, to form great thinkers, that freedom of thinking is required. On the contrary, it is as much, and even more indispensable, to enable average human beings to attain the mental stature which they are capable of.

There have been, and may again be, great individual thinkers in a general atmosphere of mental slavery. But there never has been, nor ever will be in that atmosphere, an intellectually active people. . .

Where there is a tacit convention that principles are not to be disputed; where the discussion of the greatest questions which can occupy humanity is considered to be closed, we cannot hope to find that generally high scale of mental activity which has made some periods of history so remarkable. Never when controversy avoided the subjects which are large and important enough to kindle enthusiasm, was the mind of a people stirred up from its foundations, and the impulse given which raised even persons of the most ordinary intellect to something of the dignity of thinking beings. . .

LET US NOW pass to the second division of the argument, and dismissing the supposition that any of the received opinions may be false, let us assume them to be true, and examine into the worth of the manner in which they are likely to be held, when their

truth is not freely and openly canvassed. However unwillingly a person who has a strong opinion may admit the possibility that his opinion may be false, he ought to be moved by the consideration that, however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently and fearlessly discussed, it will be held as a dead dogma, not as a living truth.

He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that. His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them. But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion.

The rational position for him would be suspension of judgment, and unless he contents himself with that, he is either led by authority, or adopts, like the generality of the world, the side to which he feels most inclination. Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by what they offer as refutations. This is not the way to do justice to the arguments, or bring them into real contact with his own mind. He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them. He must know them in their most plausible and persuasive form; he must feel the whole force of the difficulty which the true view of the subject has to encounter and dispose of, else he will never really possess himself of the portion of truth which meets and removes that difficulty.

So essential is this discipline to a real understanding of moral and human subjects, that if opponents of all important truths do not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them, and supply them with the strongest arguments which the most

skillful devil's advocate can conjure up.

In politics, again, it is almost a commonplace that a party of order or stability, and a party of progress or reform, are both necessary elements of a healthy state of political life; until the one or the other shall have so enlarged its mental grasp as to be a party equally of order and of progress, knowing and distinguishing what is fit to be preserved from what ought to be swept away.

Each of these modes of thinking derives its utility from the deficiencies of the other; but it is in a great measure the opposition of the other that keeps each within the limits of reason and sanity. Unless opinions favorable to democracy and to aristocracy, to property and to equality, to cooperation and to competition, to luxury and to abstinence, to sociality and individuality, to liberty and discipline, and all the other standing antagonisms of practical life, are expressed with equal freedom, and enforced and defended with equal talent and energy, there is no chance of both elements obtaining their due; one scale is sure to go up, and the other down.

Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the reconciling and combining of opposites, that very few have minds sufficiently capacious and impartial to make the adjustment with an approach to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners.

On any of the great open questions just enumerated, if either of the two opinions has a better claim than the other, not merely to be tolerated, but to be encouraged and countenanced, it is the one which happens at the particular time and place to be in a minority. That is the opinion which, for the time being, represents the neglected interests, the

side of human well-being which is in danger of obtaining less than its share...

Not the violent conflict between parts of the truth, but the quiet suppression of half of it, is the formidable evil: there is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by being exaggerated into falsehood. And since there are few mental attributes more rare than that judicial faculty which can sit in intelligent judgment between two sides of a question, of which only one is represented by an advocate before it, truth has no chance but in proportion as every side of it, every opinion which embodies any fraction of the truth, not only finds advocates, but is so advocated as to be listened to. . .

Individuality and Well-Being

AS IT IS useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any one thinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short, that in things which do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself. Where not the person's own character, but the traditions of customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of individual and social progress.

It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that

human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating, furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie which binds every individual to the race by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to. In proportion to the development of his individuality, each person becomes more valuable to himself, and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others. There is a greater fullness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them. . .

To be held to rigid rules of justice for the sake of others, develops the feelings and capacities which have the good of others for their object. But to be restrained in things not affecting their good, by their mere displeasure, develops nothing valuable, except such force of character as may unfold itself in resisting the restraint. If acquiesced in, it dulls and blunts the whole nature.

To give any fair play to the nature of each, it is essential that different persons should be allowed to lead different lives. In proportion as this latitude has been exercised in any age, has that age been noteworthy to posterity. Even despotism does not produce its worst effects, so long as Individuality exists under it; and whatever crushes individuality is despotism, by whatever name it may be called and whether it professes to be enforcing the will of God or the injunctions of men.

Having said that Individuality is the same thing with development, and that it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-developed human beings, I might here

close the argument; for what more or better can be said of any condition of human affairs, than that it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be? Or what worse can be said of any obstruction to good, than that it prevents this?

Doubtless, however, these considerations will not suffice to convince those who most need convincing; and it is necessary further to show that these undeveloped human beings are of some use to the undeveloped—to point out to those who do not desire liberty, and would not avail themselves of it, that they may be in some intelligible manner rewarded for allowing other people to make use of it without hindrance. . . .

In sober truth, whatever homage may be professed, or even paid, to real or supposed mental superiority, the general tendency of things throughout the world is to render mediocrity the ascendant power among mankind. In ancient history, in the Middle Ages, and in a diminishing degree through the long transition from feudality to the present time, the individual was a power in himself; and if he had either great talents or a high social position, he was a considerable power. At present individuals are lost in the crowd.

In politics it is almost a triviality to say that public opinion now rules the world. The only power deserving the name is that of masses, and of governments while they make themselves the organ of the tendencies and instincts of masses. This is as true in the moral and social relations of private life as in public transactions. Those whose opinions go by the name of public opinion, are not always the same sort of public: in America, they are the whole white population; in England, chiefly the middle class. But they are always a mass, that is to say, collective mediocrity. And

what is still greater novelty, the mass do not now take their opinions from dignitaries in Church or State, from ostensible leaders, or from books. Their thinking is done for them by men much like themselves, addressing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of the moment, through the newspaper.

I am not complaining of all this. I do not assert that anything better is compatible, as a general rule, with the present low state of the human mind. But that does not hinder the government of mediocrity from being mediocre government.

THE INITIATION of all wise or noble things comes and must come from individuals; generally at first from some one individual. The honor and glory of the average man is that he is capable of following that initiative; that he can respond internally to wise and noble things, and be led to them with his eyes open. I am not countenancing the sort of "hero-worship" which applauds the strong man of genius for forcibly seizing on the government of the world and making it do his bidding in spite of itself. All he can claim is freedom to point out the way. The power of compelling others into it is not only inconsistent with the freedom and development of all the rest, but corrupting to the strong man himself.

It does seem, however, that when the opinions of masses of merely average men are everywhere become or becoming the dominant power, the counterpoise and corrective to that tendency would be the more and more pronounced individuality of those who stand on the higher eminences of thought. It is in these circumstances most especially, that exceptional individuals, instead of being deterred, should be encouraged in acting differ-

ently from the mass. In other times there was no advantage in their doing so, unless they acted not only differently but better. In this age, the mere example of non-conformity, the mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is itself a service.

But independence of action, and disregard of custom are not solely deserving of encouragement for the chance they afford that better modes of action, and customs more worthy of general adoption, may be struck out; nor is it only persons of decided mental superiority who have a just claim to carry on their lives in their own way. There is no reason that all human existences should be constructed on some one, or some small number of patterns. If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode. Human beings are not like sheep; and even sheep are not undistinguishably alike. A man cannot get a coat or a pair of boots to fit him, unless they are either made to his measure or he has a whole warehouseful to choose from: and is it easier to fit him with a life than with a coat, or are human beings more like one another in their whole physical and spiritual conformation than in the shape of their feet? . . .

The greatness of England is now all collective: individually small, we only appear capable of anything great by our habit of combining; and with this our moral and religious philanthropists are perfectly contented. But it was men of another stamp than this that made England what it has been; and men of another stamp will be needed to prevent its decline. . . .

The spirit of improvement is not always a spirit of liberty, for it may aim

at forcing improvements on an unwilling people; and the spirit of liberty, in so far as it resists such attempts, may ally itself locally and temporarily with the opponents of improvement; but the only unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty, since by it there are as many possible independent centers of improvement as there are individuals. . . .

A people, it appears, may be progressive for a certain length of time, and then stop: when does it stop? When it ceases to possess individuality. If a similar change should befall the nations of Europe, it will not be in exactly the same shape: the despotism of custom with which these nations are threatened is not precisely stationariness. It proscribes singularity, but it does not preclude change, provided all change together. . . .

IT is not progress that we object to; on the contrary, we flatter ourselves that we are the most progressive people who ever lived. It is individuality that we war against: we should think that we had done wonders if we had made ourselves all alike; forgetting that the unlikeness of one person to another is generally the first thing which draws the attention of either to the imperfection of his own type, and the superiority of another, or the possibility, by combining the advantages of both, of producing something better than either.

What has made the European family of nations an improving, instead of a stationary portion of mankind? Not any superior excellence in them, which when it exists, exists as the effect, not as the cause; but their remarkable diversity of character and culture. Individuals, classes, nations, have been extremely unlike one another: they have struck out a great variety of paths, each

leading to something valuable; and although at every period those who travelled in different paths have been intolerant of one another, and each would have thought it an excellent thing if all the rest could have been compelled to travel his road, their attempts to thwart each other's development have rarely had any permanent success, and each has in time endured to receive the good which the others have offered. Europe is, in my judgment, wholly indebted to this plurality of paths for its progressive and many-sided development. But it already begins to possess this benefit in a considerably less degree. . .

The circumstances which surround different classes and individuals, and shape their characters, are daily becoming more assimilated. Formerly, different ranks, different neighborhoods, different trades and professions lived in what might be called different worlds; at present, to a great degree, in the same. Comparatively speaking, they now read the same things, listen to the same things, see the same things, go to the same places, have their hopes and fears directed to the same objects, have the same rights and liberties, and the same means of asserting them.

Great as are the differences of position which remain, they are nothing to those which have ceased. And the assimilation is still proceeding. All the political changes of the age promote it, since they all tend to raise the low and to lower the high. Every extension of education promotes it, because education brings people under common influences, and gives them access to the general stock of facts and sentiments. Improvements in the means of communication promote it, by bringing the inhabitants of distant places into personal contact, and keeping up a rapid

flow of changes of residence between one place and another. The increase of commerce and manufactures promotes it, by diffusing more widely advantages of easy circumstances, and opening all objects of ambition, even the highest, to general competition, whereby the desire of rising becomes no longer the character of a particular class, but of all classes.

A more powerful agency than even all these, in bringing about a general similarity among mankind, is the complete establishment, in this and other free countries, of the ascendancy of public opinion in the State. As the various social eminences which enabled persons entrenched on them to disregard the opinion of the multitude gradually became levelled; as the very idea of resisting the will of the public, when it is positively known that they have a will, disappears more and more from the minds of practical politicians; there ceases to be any social support for non-conformity—any substantive power in society which, itself opposed to the ascendancy of numbers, is interested in taking under its protection opinions and tendencies at variance with those of the public.

The combination of all these causes forms so great a mass of influences hostile to Individuality, that it is not easy to see how it can hold its ground. It will do so with increasing difficulty, unless the intelligent part of the public can be made to feel its value—to see that it is good there should be differences, even though not for the better, even though, as it may appear to them, some should be for the worse. If the claims of Individuality are ever to be asserted, the time is now, while much is still wanting to complete the enforced assimilation. It is only in the earlier stages that any stand can be made

against encroachment. The demand that all other people shall resemble ourselves grows on what it feeds on. . . . If resistance waits till life is reduced *nearly* to one uniform type, all deviations from that type will come to be considered impious, immoral, even monstrous and contrary to nature. Mankind speedily become unable to conceive diversity, when they have been for some time unaccustomed to see it.

Society and the Individual

IT WOULD BE a great misunderstanding of this doctrine, to suppose that it is one of selfish indifference, which pretends that human beings have no business with each other's conduct in life, and that they should not concern themselves about the well-doing or well-being of one another, unless their own interest is involved. Instead of any diminution, there is need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to promote the good of others. But disinterested benevolence can find other instruments to persuade people to their good, than whips and scourges, either of the literal or the metaphorical sort.

I am the last person to undervalue the self-regarding virtues; they are only second in importance, if even second, to the social. It is equally the business of education to cultivate both. But even education works by conviction and persuasion as well as by compulsion, and it is by the former only that, when the period of education is past, the self-regarding virtues should be inculcated.

Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the better from the worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter. They should be forever stimulating each other to increased exercise of their higher faculties, and increased direction of their feelings and aims towards wise instead of fool-

ish, elevating instead of degrading, objects and contemplations. But neither one person, nor any number of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with it. . . .

In this department, therefore, of human affairs, Individuality has its proper field of action. In the conduct of human beings towards one another, it is necessary that general rules should for the most part be observed, in order that people may know what they have to expect; but in each person's own concerns, his individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise. . . .

The distinction here pointed out between the part of a person's life which concerns only himself, and that which concerns others, many persons will refuse to admit. How (it may be asked) can any part of the conduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference to the other members? No person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at least to his near connections, and often far beyond them. If he injures his property, he does harm to those who directly or indirectly derived support from it, and usually diminishes, by a greater or less amount, the general resources of the community. If he deteriorates his bodily or mental faculties, he not only brings evil upon all who depended on him for any portion of their happiness, but disqualifies himself for rendering the services which he owes to his fellow-creatures generally; perhaps becomes a burden on their affection or benevolence; and if such conduct were very frequent, hardly any offence that is committed would detract more from the general sum of good. Finally, if by his

vices or follies a person does no direct harm to others, he is nevertheless (it may be said) injurious by his example; and ought to be compelled to control himself, for the sake of those whom the sight or knowledge of his conduct might corrupt or mislead. . .

But with regard to the merely contingent or, as it may be called, constructive injury which a person causes to society, by conduct which neither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself; the inconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of the greater good of human freedom. If grown persons are to be punished for not taking proper care of themselves, I would rather it were for their own sake, than under pretence of preventing them from impairing their capacity of rendering to society benefits which society does not pretend it has a right to exact. . .

But the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the public with purely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place. On questions of social morality, of duty to others, the opinion of the public, that is, of an overruling majority, though often wrong, is likely to be still oftener right; because on such questions they are only required to judge of their own interests; of the manner in which some mode of conduct, if allowed to be practised, would affect themselves. But the opinion of a similar majority, imposed as a law on the minority, on questions of self-regarding conduct, is quite as likely to be wrong as right; for in these cases public opinion means, at the best, some people's opinion of what is good or bad for other people; while very often it does not even mean that; the public, with the

most perfect indifference, passing over the pleasure or convenience of those whose conduct they censure, and considering only their own preference. . .

There is confessedly a strong tendency in the modern world towards a democratic constitution of society, accompanied or not by popular political institutions. . . We have only further to suppose a considerable diffusion of Socialist opinions, and it may become infamous in the eyes of the majority to possess more property than some very small amount, or any income not earned by manual labor. . .

A theory of "social rights," the like of which probably never before found its way into distinct language—being nothing short of this—that it is the absolute social right of every individual, that every other individual shall act in every respect exactly as he ought; that whosoever fails thereof in the smallest particular, violates my social right, and entitles me to demand from the legislature the removal of the grievance. So monstrous a principle is far more dangerous than any single interference with liberty; there is no violation of liberty which it would not justify; it acknowledges no right to any freedom whatever, except perhaps to that of holding opinions in secret, without ever disclosing them. . .

When Is a Person Free?

IT MUST by no means be supposed, because damage, or probability of damage, to the interests of others, can alone justify the interference of society, that therefore it always does justify such interference. In many cases, an individual, in pursuing a legitimate object, necessarily and therefore legitimately causes pain or loss to others, or intercepts a good which they had a reasonable hope of obtaining. Such opposi-

tions of interest between individuals often arise from bad social institutions, but are unavoidable while those institutions last; and some would be unavoidable under any institutions. Whoever succeeds in an overcrowded profession, or in a competitive examination; whoever is preferred to another in any contest for an object which both desire, reaps benefit from the loss of others, from their wasted exertion and their disappointment. But it is, by common admission, better for the general interest of mankind, that persons should pursue their objects undeterred by this sort of consequences. In other words, society admits no right, either legal or moral, in the disappointed competitors, to immunity from this kind of suffering; and feels called on to interfere, only when means of success have been employed which it is contrary to the general interest to permit—namely, fraud or treachery, and force. . .

I have already observed that, owing to the absence of any recognized general principles, liberty is often granted where it should be withheld, as well as withheld where it should be granted; and one of the cases in which, in the modern European world, the sentiment of liberty is the strongest, is a case where, in my view, it is altogether misplaced. A person should be free to do as he likes in his own concerns; but he ought not to be free to do as he likes in acting for another, under the pretext that the affairs of the other are his own affairs. . .

I have reserved for the last place a large class of questions respecting the limits of government interference, which, though closely connected with the subject of this Essay, do not, in strictness, belong to it. These are cases in which the reasons against interference do not turn upon the principle of lib-

erty; the question is not about restraining the actions of individuals, but about helping them: it is asked whether the government should do, or cause to be done, something for their benefit, instead of leaving it to be done by themselves, individually, or in voluntary combination.

The objections to government interference, when it is not such as to involve infringement of liberty, may be of three kinds.

The first is, when the thing to be done is likely to be better done by individuals than by the government. Speaking generally, there is no one so fit to conduct any business, or to determine how or by whom it shall be conducted, as those who are personally interested in it. This principle condemns the interferences, once so common, of the legislature, or the officers of government, with the ordinary processes of industry. But this part of the subject has been sufficiently enlarged upon by political economists, and is not particularly related to the principles of this Essay.

The second objection is more nearly allied to our subject. In many cases, though individuals may not do the particular thing so well, on the average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them, rather than by the government, as a means to their own mental education—a mode of strengthening their active faculties, exercising their judgment, and giving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with which they are thus left to deal. This is a principal, though not the sole, recommendation of jury trial (in cases not political); of free and popular local and municipal institutions; of the conduct of industrial and philanthropic enterprises by voluntary associations.

These are not questions of liberty, and are connected with that subject only by remote tendencies; but they are questions of development. It belongs to a different occasion from the present to dwell on these things as parts of national education; as being, in truth, the peculiar training of a citizen, the practical part of the political education of a free people, taking them out of the narrow circle of personal and family selfishness, and accustoming them to the comprehension of joint interests, the management of joint concerns—habituating them to act from public or semi-public motives, and guide their conduct by aims which unite instead of isolating them from one another.

Without these habits and powers, a free constitution can neither be worked nor preserved, as is exemplified by the too-often transitory nature of political freedom in countries where it does not rest upon a sufficient basis of local liberties.

The management of purely local business by the localities, and of the great enterprises of industry by the union of those who voluntarily supply the pecuniary means, is further recommended by all the advantages which have been set forth in this Essay as belonging to individuality of development, and diversity of modes of action. Government operations tend to be everywhere alike. With individuals and voluntary associations, on the contrary, there are varied experiments, and endless diversity of experience. What the State can usefully do is to make itself a central depository, and active circulator and diffuser, of the experience resulting from many trials. Its business is to enable each experimentalist to benefit by the experiments of others; instead of tolerating no experiments but its own.

THE THIRD and most cogent reason for restricting the interference of government is the great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power. Every function superadded to those already exercised by the government causes its influence over hopes and fears to be more widely diffused, and converts, more and more, the active and ambitious part of the public into hangers-on of the government, or of some party which aims at becoming the government.

If the roads, the railways, the banks, the insurance offices, the great joint-stock companies, the universities, and the public charities, were all of them branches of the government; if, in addition, the municipal corporations and local boards, with all that now devolves on them, became departments of the central administration; if the employes of all these different enterprises were appointed and paid by the government, and looked to the government for every rise in life; not all the freedom of the press and popular constitution of the legislature would make this or any other country free otherwise than in name. And the evil would be greater, the more efficiently and scientifically the administrative machinery was constructed—the more skillful the arrangement for obtaining the best qualified hands and heads with which to work it.

In England it has of late been proposed that all the members of the civil service of government should be selected by competitive examination, to obtain for these employments the most intelligent and instructed persons procurable; and much has been said and written for and against this proposal. One of the arguments most insisted on by its opponents is that the occupation of a permanent official servant of the State does not hold out sufficient prospects of emolument and importance to

attract the highest talents, which will always be able to find a more inviting career in the professions, or in the service of companies and other public bodies. One would not have been surprised if this argument had been used by the friends of the proposition, as an answer to its principal difficulty. Coming from the opponents it is strange enough. What is urged as an objection is the safety-valve of the proposed system. If indeed all the high talent of the country *could* be drawn into the service of the government, a proposal tending to bring about that result might well inspire uneasiness.

If every part of the business of society which required organized concert, or large and comprehensive views, were in the hands of the government, and if government offices were universally filled by the ablest men, all the enlarged culture and practised intelligence in the country, except the purely speculative, would be concentrated in a numerous bureaucracy, to whom alone the rest of the community would look for all things: the multitude for direction and dictation in all they had to do; the able and inspiring for personal advancement. To be admitted into the ranks of this bureaucracy, and when admitted, to rise therein, would be the sole objects of ambition. Under this regime, not only is the outside public ill-qualified, for want of practical experience, to criticize or check the mode of operation of the bureaucracy, but even if the accidents of despotic or the natural working of popular institutions occasionally raise to the summit a ruler or rulers of reforming inclinations, no reform can be effected which is contrary to the interest of the bureaucracy. Such is the melancholy condition of the Russian empire, as is shown in the accounts of those who have had sufficient opportunity of

observation. The Czar himself is powerless against the bureaucratic body: he can send any one of them to Siberia, but he cannot govern without them, or against their will. On every decree of his they have a tacit veto, by merely refraining from carrying it into effect.

In countries of more advanced civilization and of a more insurrectionary spirit, the public, accustomed to expect everything to be done for them by the State, or at least to do nothing for themselves without asking from the State not only leave to do it, but even how it is to be done, naturally hold the State responsible for all evil which befalls them, and when the evil exceeds their amount of patience, they rise against the government, and make what is called a revolution; whereupon somebody else, with or without legitimate authority from the nation, vaults into the seat, issues his orders to the bureaucracy, and everything goes on much as it did before; the bureaucracy being unchanged, and nobody else being capable of taking their place.

IT IS NOT, also, to be forgotten that the absorption of all the principal ability of the country into the governing body is fatal, sooner or later, to the mental activity and progressiveness of the body itself. Banded together as they are—working a system which, like all systems, necessarily proceeds in a great measure by fixed rules—the official body are under the constant temptation of sinking into indolent routine, or, if they now and then desert that mill-horse round, of rushing into some half-examined crudity which has struck the fancy of some leading member of the corps: and the sole check to these closely allied, though seemingly opposite, tendencies, the only stimulus which can keep the ability of the body itself

up to a high standard, is liability to the watchful criticism of equal ability outside the body.

It is indispensable, therefore, that the means should exist, independently of the government, of forming such ability, and furnishing it with the opportunities and experience necessary for a correct judgment of great practical affairs. If we would possess permanently a skillful and efficient body of functionaries—above all, a body able to originate and willing to adopt improvements; if we would not have our bureaucracy degenerate into a pedantocracy, this body must not engross all the occupations which form and cultivate the faculties required for the government of mankind.

To determine the point at which evils, so formidable to human freedom and advancement begin, or rather at which they begin to predominate over the benefits attending the collective application of the force of society, under its recognized chiefs, for the removal of the obstacles which stand in the way of its well-being, to secure as much of the advantages of centralized power and intelligence, as can be had without turning into governmental channels too great a proportion of the general activity, is one of the most difficult and complicated questions in the art of government.

It is, in a great measure, a question of detail, in which many and various considerations must be kept in view, and no absolute rule can be laid down.

But I believe that the practical principle in which safety resides, the ideal to be kept in view, the standard by which to test all arrangements intended for overcoming the difficulty, may be conveyed in these words: the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency. . .

A government cannot have too much of the kind of activity which does not impede, but aids and stimulates, individual exertion and development. The mischief begins when, instead of calling forth the activity and powers of individuals and bodies, it substitutes its own activity for theirs; when, instead of informing, advising, and upon occasion denouncing, it makes them work in fetters or bids them stand aside and does their work instead of them.

The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it; and a State which postpones the interests of their mental expansion and elevation, to a little more of administrative skill or that semblance of it which practice gives, in the details of business; a State, which dwarfs its men, in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial purposes, will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished; and that the perfection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything, will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish.



Libertygram


Who Said It?

1. Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.
American (1849-1887)
2. The most beautiful thing in the world is freedom of speech.
Greek (412-323? B.C.)
3. The spirit of truth and the spirit of freedom—they are the pillars of society.
Norwegian (1812-1906)
4. Our liberty can never be safe but in the hands of the people themselves.
American (1743-1826)
5. The condition upon which God has given liberty is eternal vigilance.
Irish (1750-1817)
6. Is it not a duty imposed on us, to give our weight to the side of liberty and justice, to let mankind know that we are not tired of our own institutions, and to protest against the asserted power of altering at pleasure the law of the civilized world?
American (1782-1852)
7. For, under God, we are determined that . . . we will die free men.
American (1744-1775)

DIRECTIONS

Seven famous sayings on liberty are given above. Facts on the author's country and dates of birth and death, also one letter of each name appearing on the diagram at the right, will help you solve the puzzle. Fill in the last name horizontally on the line which is numbered to correspond with the quotation. Answers on page 40.

Copyright, 1947, Plain Talk, Inc.



"Please Extend My Subscription"

September 13, 1947

Plain Talk, Inc.
240 Madison Avenue
New York 16, N. Y.

Dear Sirs:

Please extend my subscription for one year from date of expiration, and enter a one year subscription beginning with the September issue for Mr. J — — H — —, Laredo, Texas.

Also, please accept my congratulations for a publication which has plenty on the ball.

Sincerely yours,

J. P. B.
Washington, D. C.

This is one of many unsolicited renewals we have been receiving since the completion of our first year.

"I am an extremely busy man, but I find PLAIN TALK so superbly informing that I class it as imperative reading, in its entirety," is a typical letter from one of our early subscribers to PLAIN TALK.

No wonder that such readers do not want to miss a single issue of PLAIN TALK. As Dr. Maurice William of New York City put it: *"Each issue is an intensive course in major world events. I know of no other medium which gives so much in so few pages."*

You, too, will want to receive PLAIN TALK without interruption. With this expanded issue, we begin the second year of our publication. The need for it today is even greater than it was a year ago. *"PLAIN TALK hands information to us that the world needs,"* writes J. R. G., of Arkansas. *"After reading it, I have put it in the college library. Many of our students have appreciated your articles and editorials."*

Please extend your subscription today. And see that your friends and neighbors also become subscribers to PLAIN TALK—in the words of E. L. R. of Milford, Conn.—*"a true liberal magazine, which is fighting both extremes."*

THREE DOLLARS A YEAR

PLAIN TALK • 240 Madison Avenue • New York 16, N. Y.
